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Computer Architecture Department









I would like to thank many extraordinary and fantastic people for their input to the work of this
thesis. Firstly, thanks to my wife, parents and the rest of my family. It could have been impossible to
accomplish this mission without their support, understanding and fresh views. I would like to thank
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Over last years the number of Big Data, supercomputing, Internet of Things or edge systems has
snowballed. The core part of many areas and services in academia and business, are large, distributed,
and complex Information Technology (IT) systems. Any failure or performance degradation occurring
in these systems causes negative effects. The user experience is decreased, operational costs raises, and
a system loses its availability and readiness for demanding service. Also, there is a higher environmental
footprint, i.e., energy consumption. As the response, IT operators take care of resolving failures, issues,
and unexpected events. Operators are aided with IT tools for monitoring, diagnostics, and root cause
analysis. Usually, they have to troubleshoot and diagnose a system. Then, they perform some action
to recover a system to its normal state.
However, the characteristics of the emerging and future IT systems makes the diagnostics and root
cause analysis hard and complicated. These systems can contain even billions of elements, distributed
all over the Earth. Moreover, systems can frequently change, consequently making existing diagnostic
models outdated for the effective operation. Even the most skillful operators have problems to deal
with these systems to satisfy QoS constraints and deliver spectacular user experience.
In this thesis, we contribute by making a step towards NoOps operating model. NoOps stands
for no operations. In such a model of maintenance, an IT infrastructure is self-manageable and runs
without human intervention. We would like to aid operator work and in the long term substitute them
in the root cause analysis. We contribute for environments as mentioned earlier in two areas: (1)
diagnostics, root cause analysis, root cause classification, and (2) prevention of failures. In particular,
we focus on areas such as scalability, dynamism, lack of knowledge on system failures, predictability,
and prevention of failures. For each of these aspects, we use different IT environment, for a proper
diversification of the use cases.
Firstly, we propose a fast root cause analysis (RCA) system based on probabilistic reasoning. The
system can diagnose networks of devices with millions of nodes in a diagnostic model and solves the
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problem of scalability of root cause analysis. In details, we leverage the fact that these systems usually
contain repeatable elements. We create diagnostic models based on Bayesian networks. Then, we
transform them into a more efficient structure for runtime use that are Arithmetic Circuits. Thanks to
the proposed optimization in this transformation and cache-based mechanism, the solution performs
better than state of the art techniques in terms of the memory consumption and time performance.
Based on this contribution, we propose a root cause analysis system which works with dynamically
changing environments. It is very common in Internet of Things environments, where devices connect
and disconnect simultaneously, so the diagnostic model of the whole system changes rapidly. We
propose actor based root cause analysis. This method is based on distributing diagnostic calculations
through the devices and use of self-diagnostics paradigm. Thanks to this solution, results of partial
diagnosis are known even when the connectivity with a part of the diagnosed system is lost. Also, we
provide a framework to define supervising strategies which are utilized in case of a failure. We show
that the contribution works well in a simulated Internet of Things system with high dynamism in its
structure.
Secondly, we focus on the aspect of knowledge integration and partial knowledge of a diagnosed
system. The path to NoOps involves not only precise, reliable and fast diagnostics but also reusing
as much knowledge as possible after the system is reconfigured or changed. The biggest challenge is
to leverage knowledge on one IT system and reuse this knowledge for diagnostics of another, different
system. We propose a weighted graph framework which can transfer knowledge and perform high-
quality diagnostics of IT systems. We encode all possible data in a graph representation of a system
state and automatically calculate weights of these graphs. Then, thanks to the similarity evaluation,
we transfer knowledge about failures from one system to another and use it for diagnostics. We
successfully evaluate the proposed approach on Spark, Hadoop, Kafka and Cassandra systems. For
this purpose, we use an on-premise Big Data cluster and a cloud system of containers.
Thirdly, we focus on the predictability of a supercomputing environment and prevention of failures.
Failed jobs in a supercomputer cause not only waste in CPU time or energy consumption but also
decrease work efficiency of users. Mining data collected during the operation of data centers helps
to find patterns explaining failures and can be used to predict them. Automating system reactions,
e.g., early termination of jobs, when software failures are predicted does not only increase availability
and reduce operating cost, but it also frees administrators’ and users’ time. We explore a unique
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dataset containing the topology, operation metrics, and job scheduler history from the petascale Mistral
supercomputer. We extract the most relevant system features deciding on the final state of a job
through decision trees. Then, we successfully propose actions to prevent failures. We create a model
to predict job evolution based on power time series of nodes. Finally, we evaluate the effect on CPU
time saving for static and dynamic job termination policies. We finish the thesis with a short discussion




En los últimos años, la cantidad de Big Data, supercomputación, dispositivos IoT o sistemas edge se
ha disparado. Grandes sistemas distribuidos y complejos de tecnoloǵıa de la información (TI) forman
la parte central de muchas áreas y servicios en el mundo académico y la industria. Cualquier falla o
degradación del rendimiento que ocurra en estos sistemas puede acarrear importantes efectos adversos:
una experiencia de usuario empobrecida, costos operativos que aumentan y pérdida de disponibilidad
del sistema y su capacidad para operar en condiciones óptimas. Además, los fallos pueden contribuir
a una huella ambiental más alta, a través de un mayor consumo de enerǵıa. Como respuesta, los
operadores de TI se encargan de resolver fallas, problemas y eventos inesperados. Se ayuda a los
operadores con herramientas de TI para el monitoreo, el diagnóstico y el análisis de causa ráız. Por lo
general, primero tienen que solucionar y diagnosticar un sistema, y luego realizan alguna acción para
recuperar el sistema a su estado normal.
Sin embargo, las caracteŕısticas de los sistemas de TI emergentes y futuros dificultan y complican
el diagnóstico y el análisis de la causa ráız. Estos sistemas pueden contener incluso miles de millones
de elementos distribuidos por toda la Tierra. Además, los sistemas pueden cambiar con frecuencia,
lo que hace que los modelos de diagnóstico existentes estén obsoletos mermando aśı su efectividad.
Incluso los operadores más hábiles tienen problemas para lidiar con estos sistemas para satisfacer los
niveles de calidad de servicio (QoS) esperados y ofrecer una experiencia de usuario impecable.
En esta tesis, contribuimos dando un paso hacia el modelo operativo NoOps. NoOps no significa
no realizar ninguna operación, sinó que una infraestructura de TI sea autogestionable y funcione sin
intervención humana. Nos gustaŕıa ayudar al trabajo del operador y, a largo plazo, sustituirlo por un
sistema automatizado de análisis de la causa ráız. En ese sentido contribuimos en dos áreas: (1) el
diagnóstico, análisis de causa ráız basado en clasificación, y (2) prevención de fallas. En particular,
nos enfocamos en áreas tales como escalabilidad, dinamismo, falta de conocimiento sobre fallas del
sistema, previsibilidad y prevención de fallas. Para cada uno de estos aspectos, utilizamos un entorno
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de TI diferente para diversificar los casos de uso.
En primer lugar, proponemos un sistema rápido de análisis de causa ráız (RCA) basado en ra-
zonamiento probabiĺıstico. El sistema puede diagnosticar redes de dispositivos con millones de nodos
en un modelo de diagnóstico y resuelve el problema de la escalabilidad del análisis de causa ráız. En
particular, aprovechamos el hecho de que estos sistemas generalmente contienen elementos repetidos.
Creamos modelos de diagnóstico basados en redes Bayesianas para estos elementos repetidos. Luego,
los transformamos en una estructura más eficiente en tiempo de ejecución que son los Circuitos Ar-
itméticos. Gracias a la optimización propuesta en este mecanismo de transformación y basado en
caché, la solución funciona mejor que las técnicas más avanzadas en términos de consumo de memoria
y tiempo. Con base en esta contribución, proponemos un sistema de análisis de causa ráız que fun-
ciona con entornos que cambian dinámicamente. Esto es muy común en los entornos de IoT, donde los
dispositivos se conectan y desconectan con frecuencia, por lo que el modelo de diagnóstico de todo el
sistema cambia rápidamente. En este entorno proponemos un análisis de causa ráız basado en actores.
Este método se basa en la distribución de cálculos de diagnóstico a través de los dispositivos y el uso
del paradigma de autodiagnóstico. Gracias a esta solución, los resultados del diagnóstico parcial se
conocen incluso cuando se pierde la conectividad con una parte del sistema diagnosticado. Además,
brindamos un marco para definir estrategias de supervisión que se utilizan en caso de falla. Mostramos
que la contribución funciona bien en un sistema IoT simulado con un alto dinamismo en su estructura.
En segundo lugar, nos centramos en el aspecto de la integración del conocimiento y el conocimiento
parcial de un sistema diagnosticado. El camino hacia NoOps implica no solo diagnósticos precisos,
confiables y rápidos, sino también la reutilización del mayor conocimiento posible después de que
el sistema se reconfigure o cambie. El mayor desaf́ıo es aprovechar el conocimiento en un sistema
de TI y reutilizar este conocimiento para el diagnóstico de otro sistema diferente. Proponemos una
aproximación basada en grafos con pesos que puede transferir conocimiento entre sistemas diferentes y
realizar diagnósticos de alta calidad de los sistemas de TI. Codificamos todos los datos posibles en un
grafo de un estado del sistema y calculamos automáticamente los pesos de asociados a los elementos de
este grafo. Luego, gracias a una función de similitud entre grafos, transferimos el conocimiento sobre
fallas de un sistema a otro y lo usamos para el diagnóstico. Evaluamos con éxito el enfoque propuesto
en los sistemas Spark, Hadoop, Kafka y Cassandra. Para este propósito, usamos un clúster para Big
Data (con acceso f́ısico) y un sistema de contenedores en la nube.
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En tercer lugar, nos centramos en la previsibilidad de un entorno de supercomputación y la pre-
vención de fallas. Los trabajos fallidos en una supercomputadora no solo causan pérdidas en el tiempo
de CPU o en el consumo de enerǵıa, sino que también disminuyen la eficiencia del trabajo de los usuar-
ios. Los datos recopilados durante la operación de los centros de datos pueden ayudar a encontrar
patrones que expliquen fallas y pueden usarse para predecirlos. La automatización de las reacciones
del sistema, por ejemplo, la terminación anticipada de trabajos, cuando se prevén fallas de software,
no solo aumenta la disponibilidad y reduce los costos operativos, sino que también libera el tiempo de
los administradores y los usuarios. Exploramos un conjunto de datos único que contiene la topoloǵıa,
las métricas de operación y el historial del planificador de tareas del superordenador Mistral. Extrae-
mos las caracteŕısticas más relevantes del sistema para decidir sobre el estado final de un trabajo a
través de árboles de decisión. Luego, proponemos acciones para evitar fallas. Creamos un modelo para
predecir la evolución del trabajo basado en la serie temporal de potencia de los nodos. Finalmente,
evaluamos el efecto sobre el ahorro de tiempo de la CPU para las poĺıticas de terminación de trabajos
estática y dinámica. Terminamos la tesis con una breve discusión sobre las contribuciones de esta tesis




Last decades, global computerization directed all areas of our life. Complicated, large, distributed, and
heterogeneous computing systems, e.g., supercomputers, Big Data, Internet of Things, Cyber-Physical
Systems serve human in diverse domains. Even, people who are not engaged in IT research or industry
are exposed to the IT world. For instance, as simple citizens, we use e.g., smart transportation, smart
health-care systems, and crowd-sourced systems. However, no matter what the structure and scale
of these systems is, all of them have two things in common. First, they all face failures degrading
their performance and reliability. Second, human need to take care of diagnostics, reconfiguration,
and improvement of these systems. Finally, in a considerable part, the quality of a service depends on
the reaction and skills of operators. However, as the growth of IT systems is theoretically unlimited,
the capacity of the human brain is. We have already reached the point when human is not able to
maintain overgrown systems. Is it possible that these systems take care of themselves automatically
without the people engagement?
“One never notices what has been done; one can only see what remains to be done.”
— Marie Sk lodowska-Curie
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Today, Information Technology (IT) systems have already become a fundamental part of many activ-
ities and services in business, academia and daily life. These systems have different scales, structures
and types of infrastructure. However, it does not prevent us from saying that reliability is a key and
common aspect of running all of them. For instance, let us think about Internet of Things (IoT) devices
communicating with cloud services running on centralized data centers. This system is complex and
dynamic, many failures cannot be resolved in seconds or minutes, and the user demand for a service is
not satisfied. Another example are business applications, whether on-premise or in the cloud, failures
usually causes expensive business service delays. Also, consider supercomputers, where failures of jobs
decrease resource availability and increase operational costs. Any failure or performance degradation
occurring in these systems causes negative effects.
Because of failures and low reliability of a system, the user demand is not satisfied, operational
costs are increased, and a system loses its availability and readiness for the service. Also, there is a
higher environmental footprint, i.e., energy consumption. As a response, IT operators take care of
resolving failures, issues, and unexpected events. Operators are aided with different IT tools used
for monitoring, diagnostics, and root cause analysis. Then, they perform some action to recover a
system back to its normal operation. However, some systems are not in a reach of troubleshooting
capabilities of even the most skilled and experienced operators. Operators have problems to deal with
these systems to satisfy QoS constraints and deliver acceptable user experience.
In this thesis, we contribute by making a step towards NoOps operating model. NoOps stands
for no operations. NoOps is focused on externalizing the operation of the system and then removing
operations from the infrastructure at the user side. One of the ways to implement such a model
of maintenance is to run a self-manageable IT infrastructure and without human intervention. We
would like to aid operator work and in the long term substitute them in the root cause analysis. We
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contribute for environments as mentioned earlier in two areas: (1) diagnostics, root cause analysis, root
cause classification, and (2) prevention of failures. In particular, we focus on areas such as scalability,
dynamism, lack of knowledge on system failures, predictability, and prevention of failures.
For each of these aspects, we use different IT environment, proving that our solutions are transversal
across multiple use cases. In particular, we research with a petascale supercomputer, Big Data cluster,
containers, and a simulated Internet of Things environment.
2
1.1 A step towards NoOps: Model-driven automation and reliability enhancement for
large distributed computing systems
Reacting to failures and recovering a system fast is the main objective of every IT system operator.
Many IT tools support operators to troubleshoot and resolve issues in IT systems. However, to step
further and transform the characteristics of operators’ work, the problems occurring while working
with complex and large environments should be resolved. Depending on the type of a system, an
operator and troubleshooting tools might face some of the following problems.
• scalability – system scales up significantly. How should a diagnostics framework, including a
system model and diagnosing algorithm scale?
• dynamism – a system changes its structure and configuration rapidly and in an unpredictable
way. How to diagnose such a system to provide an updated diagnosis?
• partial or unknown diagnostic model of a system – a system has been already set up, or
it has been reconfigured. How to diagnose it from its start, without having neither observations
on failures nor the diagnostic model?
• predictability – is it possible to predict failures? How early is it possible to prevent them?
Addressing the above issues cannot only increase the effectiveness of diagnostics and system recov-
ery, but also it can help in automatizing it. Moreover, a human can be eliminated from a diagnostic
process which is often repetitive but complex. In this thesis, we do a step on the way to NoOps.
It means an operational model of an IT system where no human is engaged in maintenance. All
maintenance processes are performed automatically, and an IT system is self-manageable.
In Figure 1.1 we show a graph presenting a holistic view of problems of reliability of an IT system
and contributions presented in this thesis. IT systems are often under continuous development and
change, in order to satisfy a user’s demand and requirements. These processes may result in recon-
figuration of a system, scaling and failures, e.g., caused by software errors. The resulting problems
such as occurring failures, difficult and resource-consuming troubleshooting are responsible for even
worse consequences. The most significant ones are decreased QoS and resource availability, increased
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), energy consumption and environmental footprint. Directly, these
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consequences can result in, e.g., the necessity to engage more workforce for troubleshooting, repeat
failed jobs, recover a system from backups.
Figure 1.1: Graph presenting detailed causes (blue), problems (yellow and orange) and consequences (red) in IT systems.
Green rectangles represent solutions presented in this Thesis.
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1.2 Contributions
We take a challenge of aiding human in complex diagnostics. The objectives of the thesis are:
• Enable fast root cause analysis in large, distributed environments
• Enable diagnostics with missing observations and knowledge
• Automate system reaction for predicted failures
The contributions of this thesis are the following.
1. Root cause analysis system based on split Bayesian networks and their transformation that are
Arithmetic Circuits. The system leverages the fact that in large IT systems there are many
repeated components, it manipulates Arithmetic Circuits and caches the partial results and
structures. The system scales to millions of nodes in a diagnostic model. (Chapter 4)
2. Actor based root cause analysis system. The system uses resources of the devices making up a
system for root cause analysis calculations. Actor based model allows for the implementation of
different policies in case of failures. (Chapter 4)
3. An integration of metrics, logs and static information to a weighted graph that represents the
state of a diagnosed system. Logs are encoded automatically as node attributes without the
necessity to define any metadata. (Chapter 5)
4. A framework for knowledge transfer using weighted graphs. The framework can find the closest
repository graph that describes the runtime failure, even if a diagnosed system has different
structure and functionality than a graph representing previously registered failure. (Chapter 5)
5. Insights and results of data mining of the operations of a petascale supercomputing environment.
The analysis includes the discovery of trends, phenomena, and correlations leading to the expla-
nation of a job final state. We discover importance of features and data sources deciding and
predicting a job final state. (Chapter 6)
6. Static and dynamic job failure prevention policies. The static policy is created using Decision
Trees, while the dynamic one uses a Convolutional Neural Network. The static policy can predict
failed jobs using all information known at the time of a job submission, including historical data.
The dynamic one uses only power metrics of nodes allocated to a job. (Chapter 6)
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1.3 Contents of the document
The content of the document is the following. Firstly, we provide introduction to the research problem
in Chapter 1 and describe background of the research and related work in Chapter 2. Then, we
describe important IT environments for which we target our solutions in Chapter 3. The environments
include a supercomputer, Big Data cluster, system of containers in a cloud, and a simulated IoT system.
We use these environments for experiments and evaluations in the next sections.
In Chapter 4 we address the problem of the scalability of diagnosing large IoT environments. We
propose a scalable and fault tolerant root cause analysis framework for distributed large heterogeneous
environments. Firstly, we propose a solution based on probabilistic reasoning. Thanks to the proposed
approximate modeling and reasoning, the proposed method can deal with diagnostic models consisting
of millions of elements. Then, we propose a distributed root cause analysis framework which deals
with dynamically changing IoT environments. The framework can perform root cause analysis of an
IoT system with constantly connecting and disconnecting devices. We evaluate both approaches on a
simulated IoT system.
In Chapter 5 we address the problem of diagnosing a system when there is partial knowledge
about symptoms of a failure. We contribute by root cause classification system which performs cross-
system diagnostics through knowledge transfer. Firstly, we present a graph similarity framework.
Then, using this framework we represent a system state integrating logs, metrics and system topology.
We show how this framework is used for root cause classification through evaluation of the similarity
between two graphs. One graph represents a state of a monitored system, the other one a system state
during a failure. We evaluate this framework on a Big Data cluster running Spark [2] and Hadoop [3].
Then, we show how the proposed graph framework can be used for transferring knowledge from one
system to another. Thanks to the proposed graph framework, we acquire knowledge from one system
and diagnose completely another system. As an example, we evaluate knowledge transfer approach on
a cloud environment running containers and micro-services, in particular, Kafka [4] and Cassandra [5].
In Chapter 6 we explore predictability of a supercomputing environment and propose a frame-
work for prevention of failures. Firstly, we explore how predictable a supercomputing environment
is. Through advanced data mining, we detect trends and phenomena describing user-application-
supercomputer ecosystem. Also, we show the most meaningful job features deciding on the final state
of a job. Then, we contribute with a framework for prevention of failures. We propose a static and
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dynamic policy for early termination of jobs predicted for failure. For a static policy, we use Decision
Trees, which allow creating a white-box explainable model of failed jobs. Thanks to this model, we
can evaluate jobs at the time of their submission. For a dynamic one, we use a model based on Convo-
lutional Neural Networks. Thanks to this model, we can predict failures during the runtime of a job,
and take appropriate actions based on these predictions.
In Chapter 7 we provide the wrap-up and propose directions of the future work. Also, at the end
of each chapter, we provide detailed conclusions and particular future work plans. At the end of the





In this chapter, we describe work related to the research field of this thesis. In Section 2.1, we focus
on root cause analysis through networks of plausible inference and Probabilistic Relational Models [6].
We focus on state of the art of root cause analysis and diagnostics for a use case of the Internet of
Things and Cyber-Physical systems. Then, in Section 2.2 we study work related to graph-based root
cause analysis and root cause classification systems. We focus on a graph representation of a system
state including metrics and logs. Also, we explore work related to cross-system knowledge transfer.
In Section 2.3 we study work related to prediction and analysis of failures in HPC environment. In
particular, we focus on different machine learning techniques. Also, we explore creating different models
with the use of logs for diagnostics.
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2.1 Root cause analysis of distributed systems: graph approaches for handling large and
dynamic models
Methods like root cause analysis support operations of large and complex environments. In this
Section, we describe existing solutions and research mainly focusing on the Internet of Things and
Cyber-Physical Systems. Regarding the particular computational and modeling framework, we focus
on Networks of Plausible Inference. We start with a study of related work on Bayesian networks,
go through Probabilistic Relational Models, and we explore the most critical research on Bayesian
networks which leads to large-scale deployment of these networks.
2.1.1 Root cause analysis for the Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems
High-performance root cause analysis for large distributed environments is an active research topic. The
authors of [7–9] focus on automatic analytics of events and black-box models of cloud environments.
Rarely, publications present work which uses probabilistic relational models for troubleshooting large
environments. However, as we show later on, probabilistic reasoning is a practical framework for root
cause analysis. A conventional approach for implementing root cause analysis is using classification
algorithms and algorithms based on the correlation of alarms [10]. Research presented in [11] provides
a graph-based root cause analysis system, and the authors use it on a large distributed system of
servers. For instance, the authors of [12] propose a root cause analysis system for complex enterprise
networks. The presented research introduces the idea of constructing a causality graph between events
in the system which is used for failure localization. The challenges of using root cause analysis systems
are accuracy, diagnosis time, tractability and scalability of these solutions.
Also, there is a growing amount of research that considers root cause analysis in the Internet of
Things ecosystem. However, performing such analysis considering all the tiers presented in Figure 3.1
is not intensely studied in the literature. Each of these layers has different components and topologies.
However, a common characteristic of these systems is that they contain a lot of repeated elements.
This fact should be utilized by diagnostic systems to improve their performance during the runtime.
In [13] authors summarize the main research motivations for the reliability of cloud services. They
state the difficulty of detection of failures and faults in the cloud; they mention the problem of little
research on scalable fault detection methods, and difficulties in recognizing the causes of failures.
Besides, Aggarwal [14] states the problem of having incomplete data transmitted from sensors and the
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significance of this problem for Big Data analytics. In [15] it is stated that failures in fog computing can
be localized in sensors, network, lack of network coverage, a service platform or the web application.
Authors in [16] propose the integration of Big Data with a Cyber-Physical System, describe a data-
driven approach to building fault tolerant control systems and they emphasize its significance via
research. Moreover, the accurate mathematical models, will not be able to deal with the scale and
computational complexity of large Internet of Things structures.
Furthermore, many researchers focus on root cause analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems [17]. The
authors of [17] describe Cyber-Physical Systems as systems that integrate computing, communication
and storage capabilities with physical processes, monitoring, and control. CPSs should perform their
activities securely, efficiently and in real-time. CPSs have to distribute computations while having
effective network control [17]. The described systems are characterized by a high degree of integration of
physical devices and large geographical dispersion. These issues imply that controlling and monitoring
need to be highly distributed. For instance, these properties are observed in IoT and Smart Cities
applications. The authors state that new tools and algorithms should be created for fault analysis in
the mentioned environments. Additionally, authors of [18] emphasize that the reliability of CPSs is an
active problem to address.
The idea of using resources of a system for diagnostics is widely described in [19]. The authors
propose distributed diagnostics for wireless sensor networks. The considered solution is motivated
by the loss of information transferred from sensors to the central module of the system. However,
due to highly limited resources of sensors (tens of KB of memory), complex models cannot be used
for diagnostics. Another approach of root cause analysis system for CPS is presented in [20]. The
authors propose a system that performs hierarchical fault reasoning. The system starts with light
diagnostic calculations and performs more complex ones when necessary. However, the solution does
not consider dynamically changing large-scale systems. For instance, a proactive health monitoring
system is presented in [21]. It is principally motivated by the necessity of a quick and dependable
response during diagnostics and optimal resource consumption in limited working conditions. The
authors propose an adaptive diagnosis quality driven solution of the sensor activation problem by
choosing an optimal reconfiguration of the diagnosing system. Nevertheless, the researchers use a rule-
based approach and a sparse matrix which can cause calculation problems in extreme scale systems,
where the number of components is on the hundreds of thousands.
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2.1.2 Fundamental networks of plausible inference: Bayesian networks for root cause
analysis
One of the underlying frameworks for creating and inferring diagnostic models are Bayesian net-
works [6]. An example Bayesian network is presented in Figure 2.1. A BN helps to describe the prob-
ability of some events happening, given their probabilistic conditional dependencies on other events.
For instance, the example BN, can solve top-down problems like ”What is the probability that the
device will disconnect, once the battery status is low and network coverage is medium?” Also, it may
solve bottom-up (root cause analysis) problems: ”Device has disconnected. Why? Which event is
the cause? Which event was more likely to happen: the device is overheated, or edge dropped the
connection?”
Figure 2.1: Example Bayesian network (BN) representing diagnostic model for a device connected to an edge device.
Formally, a Bayesian network is a probabilistic network which describes relations between proba-
bilistic variables in the form of a Directed Acyclic Graph. Variables used in Bayesian networks can be
categorical (finite number of values), e.g., error type having value ”kernel” or ”system”; or continuous,
e.g., temperature, CPU load. In the case of categorical variables, we define probabilities with tables.
Each node contains a conditional probability table (CPT) that describes conditional probabilities of
states of this node depending on the states of the parent nodes. Bayesian networks represent well
dependencies between causes and symptoms. BNs are often used when it is hard to create an exact
analytic or simplified model of a system. They are used widely in the modeling of events and phe-
nomena in many different domains, e.g., IT, medicine, finance, sport. Primarily, they are used where
diagnostic and reasoning models should leverage expert knowledge, and enough data is given to build
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distributions of the variables or calculate their probabilities.
When compared to other diagnostic techniques [22], the Bayesian networks are distinguished as a
solution for problems of an unacceptable quantity of false alarms. These alarms can be set off by a
monitoring system with a threshold approach. One of the most significant advantages of using Bayesian
networks is that a system with Bayesian reasoning can provide early alerts before the fault occurs. It is
especially useful in systems where many faults do not develop gradually over time. Rather they occur
instantaneously. In [23], authors describe software health monitoring system using the BNs designed
for monitoring, diagnosis, and prediction in the software-hardware environment. The designed system
meets the requirements of being powerful enough to reliably detect and localize significant failures with
a provision of advanced reasoning, but the research does not include large-scale deployment.
Another essential publication [24] on BN presents large-scale deployment of a diagnostic system
for web applications. The solution is based on Bayesian networks and noisy-OR nodes, and it uses
approximate reasoning for fast diagnosis. Acceptable accuracy characterizes the solution. Also, a
significant industrial deployment and research on inference through BN is presented in [25]. The authors
optimize BN reasoning for large-scale Virtual Private Networks. They perform failure diagnostics, using
reasoning in anomalous regions of a failed node.
2.1.3 Object relationship modeling with Bayesian networks: Probabilistic Relational
Models
When used for large systems, Bayesian networks are even more complicated. This makes them difficult
to create or update. The solution is modeling objects with underlying Bayesian networks. The idea of
splitting BNs into objects that are related to the modeled components is well introduced and explained
in the literature in the area of Probabilistic Relational Models (PRM) [26, 27]. In this framework,
a reasonably significant amount of work on structured probabilistic inference is done in [28] which
produced high-performance algorithms for PRM, using d-separation. The authors of [29] analyze and
describe the limitations of sectioning Bayesian networks. Another step for optimization of Bayesian
inference and model construction was made in [30], introducing a general framework for canonical
models. Its primary objective was the simplification of complex Bayesian models, especially those in
which nodes have many parents.
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2.1.4 Transforming probabilistic networks to increase run-time performance
Darwiche et al. [31,32] proposed compilation to Arithmetic Circuits (AC) to accelerate problem resolu-
tion time using BNs. ACs contain numbers, add and multiply operators; they are the standard model
for computing polynomials. In probabilistic reasoning domain, ACs are an optimized structure to
answer queries like “what is the most probable cause of a particular failure”, “why a system manifests
such a state”, “why a failure occurred?”. As Darwiche et al. propose, the probability distribution
induced by a Bayesian network can be represented using a multilinear function (MLF). MLF is rep-
resented by Arithmetic Circuits, in which sum operators are changed to max operators. We call this
representation Maximizer Circuit. An example circuit is presented in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Example Maximizer Circuit. Comparing to AC, sum operators are changed for max operators. Lambdas
are evidence indicators, and thetas are probability values.
The authors of [33] describe a successful deployment of Arithmetic Circuits in the diagnosis of
spacecraft electrical systems. Another application of precompiled BN in a diagnostic system is pre-
sented in [34] but, this publication explores small systems, and it does not consider large-scale RCA.
In particular, authors neither consider replicated components nor their subgraphs in Bayesian network
representation. However, Arithmetic Circuits present numerical problems for huge systems that have
millions of nodes, and furthermore, compilation requires large amounts of memory.
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2.2 Graph representation of a system state and graph similarity for diagnostics and root
cause analysis
In this Section we focus on work related to Graph representation of a system state, use of graphs for
root cause analysis and root cause classification. Then, we move to the area of diagnosing a system
state with partial or no knowledge.
2.2.1 Graph-based systems for root cause classification
Monitoring and logging systems are responsible for providing full observability of a system state, which
is one of the most important inputs for a root cause classification system. Current research in this
field is focused on dealing not only with the huge size and complexity of information encoded in logs
but also with fault tolerance and use of partial information [35]. Usually, operators use sources of
information in a troubleshooting process separately, e.g., metrics and logs. Diagnostic tools do not
combine well descriptive data such as text messages with metrics. One of the best ways to do so is
by utilizing a graph representation of a system state. Constructing proper graph representation allows
for anomaly detection and diagnostics [36]. Graph-based approaches are widely used for root cause
classification, detection and prediction of abnormal events and failures [37–41].
When we represent system states as graphs, we can compare the encoded state by evaluating
the similarity between them [42, 43]. An important contribution in the field of diagnostics via graph
similarity is the work of Papadimitriou et al. [44] that evaluates graph similarities to find anomalies in
the web. The authors consider different approaches for similarity evaluation which are limited to the
topologies of compared graphs. Work on the similarity between different texts and logs is presented
in [45, 46] and it is widely used for diagnostics of IT systems. Research of Putra et al. [47] includes
graph-based text similarity evaluation. Other important work on utilizing similarity between logs that
are used for diagnostics can be found in [48–50].
2.2.2 Performing diagnostics without exact knowledge of system failures
Diagnostic systems can gather the knowledge in one domain and reuse this knowledge for diagnosing
similar systems with symptoms in similar knowledge domains. Generally, we call this type of use of
knowledge transfer learning [51] and the heterogeneous transfer learning when the knowledge comes
from different systems [52]. In this thesis, we focus on a scenario of the transductive transfer learning,
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where the data is labeled in the source domain, but not in the target knowledge domain. According
to this area, one of the paths to deploy transfer learning in diagnostic systems is to apply similarity
measures between a diagnosed state and the abnormal state to be diagnosed.
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2.3 Model-driven prediction of failures in distributed systems
In this Section we explore work related to workload and failure analysis of supercomputers and HPC
environments. We study research on prediction of failures and different actions taken for prevention.
Then, we move to the use of logs for diagnostics and failure classification.
2.3.1 Predicting and preventing failures in High-performance Computing
Authors in [53] describe the role of software in failures occurring in data centers. Software problems
in an OS, middleware, application, or the wrong configuration, e.g., underestimated resources, cause
the majority of job failures in HPC workload [54, 55]. The authors of [56] discover the correlation
between failures, and different characteristics of supercomputer operations, such as node usage, last
state of a job, and hardware metrics. This research explores state sequences from the perspective of a
node. The authors perform job-oriented analysis only to point users with a high failure rate. Analysis
of logs and the rate of failed jobs allows detecting slow-downs and targeted failures [57]. Authors
in [58] propose a message-based prediction system for failures in a data center. Recently, the authors
in [59] characterized workload in an HPC environment with the main goals to find patterns across
different applications and disciplines. Latest work presented in [60] analyzes failures of the Oak Ridge
supercomputer. The authors describe hardware reliability, correlate failure types, and investigate
failure trends across time and space. However, leveraging user history for prediction of failed jobs and
learning application workload patterns is not a primary focus area in these publications. Also, there
are not many publications addressing the separate analysis of jobs and job steps. Survey on failures
prediction confirms this [61].
There is much research on ML used for data center maintenance for either prediction or classification
problems [62–65]. For instance, research in [66] uses dynamic association rules to predict failures in
the Blue Gene. The authors of [67] focus on predicting failures in computing nodes, and as a reaction,
redirecting a job to another set of nodes. Another possible action is checkpointing, and the authors
of [68] investigate the optimal policy to reduce the trade-off between checkpoints frequency and mean
time between failures. The authors in [69] use power and temperature metrics to predict errors in
GPU clusters via neural network (NN) model. Recently, decision trees are implemented for failure
prediction in HPC domain [70]. The proposed algorithm identifies the causes of failures, performing
better comparing to other SoA techniques.
17
Despite the popularity and progress in ML algorithms and software, the area of prediction of the
final HPC job states through accurate modeling of power series seems to be unexplored. Power series
can be used to depict load of a node, since the electrical power of a node is proportional to the
CPU load. It is helpful to use power series in many HPC environments, especially while CPU load
is not acquired in order not to cause any inference with monitoring agents and a computing node
performance. Power series depicting load of many nodes utilized by a particular job is a multivariate
time series, while power series for one node only it is called univariate time series. The focus of most
of the work is put on predicting failures per hardware unit, rather than learning workload patterns of
failed jobs. The complexity of IT systems and their dynamic structure are one of the main obstacles
to create accurate models. The authors in [71] propose power modeling techniques via Petri networks,
to estimate power consumption. Also, the work presented in [72] reports research on power profiling in
HPC environments. The authors discuss application network architecture, performance, and scalability
in the dimension of power consumption, and they propose a system for accurate power monitoring.
2.3.2 Modelling system behavior through logs
The logs of an IT system are a valuable source of information used for data-driven diagnostics and
prognostics of a system state. A usual method of working with logs, it is exploring the statistics
and the occurrence of a set of key terms using log parsers, indexers, and miners. The authors of
a survey on data-driven techniques in computing system management [73] claim that to realize the
goal of self-management, systems need to automatically monitor, characterize, and understand their
behaviors and dynamics; mine events to uncover useful patterns, and acquire valuable knowledge from
historical log/event data. Fundamental knowledge of diverse approaches of error log processing is
found in [74, 75]. Some simple mining methods include log key terms occurrence correlation [76], and
modeling a multithreaded system behavior through graphs or sequences representing system calls. For
instance, the authors of [74] deal with the problem of failure prediction through clustering similar log
sequences. They propose an algorithm to assign the source of failures to logs, using Levenshtein’s edit
distance.
Recently, a considerable part of work on automated diagnostics is performed with the help of
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. The DeepLog system [77] is one of the most significant
contributions in this field. The authors propose a system for anomaly detection and diagnosis which
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is based on deep learning. The performance and accuracy of the solution are high. However, to use it,
there is a necessity of defining metadata. For this reason, the solution has limited usability regarding
full automation. Authors of [78] propose an approach to mine time-weighted graphs from logs with
many threads running. The solution evaluated in cloud environments performs with high recall and
precision. Authors in [79] use casual inference to diagnose network failures. They mine casual graphs
from logs, considering connected devices in a graph. One of the conventional approaches to deal
with log preprocessing and comparison is transforming log entries to vectors, using the Word2Vec
algorithm [80, 81]. A recent attempt to leverage Word2Vec for root cause classification is described





LARGE AND DISTRIBUTED IT ENVIRONMENTS DEMANDING HUGE
OPERATOR EFFORT IN MAINTENANCE
In this chapter, we describe IT environments which need significant human effort for diagnostics and
troubleshooting. We use these environments as use cases for different research problems. We make a
choice based on the following criteria. Firstly, we want to cover a wide spectrum of use cases, that is
why we do not limit research to one environment. Secondly, we want the chosen environments to imitate
different problems of diagnostic systems and operators: scalability, dynamism, partial knowledge and
predictability. Also, we choose the ones which are not only critical today but are essential for the
future development of the IT sector. The chosen platforms are: 1) a supercomputer, that is widely
described in Section 3.1; 2) an Internet of Things stack described in in Section 3.2; and 3) a Big Data
cluster and a system of microservices based on containers, that is described in Section 3.3. At the
end of each section, we emphasize typical problems which require a lot of maintenance in a particular
environment.
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3.1 An HPC environment: The Mistral supercomputer
The following Section presents a short description of a supercomputing environment used for research
presented in Chapter 6. The German Climate Computing Center manages the supercomputer Mistral1
that is ranked as 55th most powerful on the world as of June 20182. The HPC system has a peak per-
formance of 3.14 PetaFLOPS and consists of approximately 100,000 computing cores, 266 Terabytes
of memory, and 54 PiB of Lustre file system. Also, DKRZ maintains an automated tape data archive
with the capacity of around 500 PiB. The supercomputer workload is generated by a variety of applica-
tions and simulators used in areas such as climate science, geology, and natural environment. Example
applications include simulation of Hamburg ecosystem and its pollution, North Sea ecosystem, and
Earth climate change.
In details, the supercomputing facility contains 3336 computing nodes placed in 47 racks, and
about 90 special nodes dedicated for maintenance activities, data pre-processing, post-processing and
advanced visualizations. Understanding the data center structure and topology is essential for the
process of creation of diagnostic models. This knowledge helps to determine the structures from which
we need to collect data and understand discovered phenomena and trends. Computing nodes are
placed in racks. Majority of the racks are homogeneous having mounted the same 72 blades. Each
rack encloses maximum 4 chassis, with the maximum capacity of 18 blades per chassis. Each of these
units: rack, chassis, and a node are managed by a dedicated controller. There are rack management
controllers, chassis management controllers and blade management controllers. In this thesis we utilize
data coming from blade management controller.
The computing blades installed in the Mistral are Atos Bull B720 containing two computing nodes.
These nodes can contain either Intel Xeon 12C 2.5 GHz (Haswell) or Intel Xeon 18C 2.1 GHz (Broad-
well). Table 3.1 presents the number of blades by type and the number of racks containing only one
type of a blade. For instance, B720 24 64 stands for Atos Bull B720 with 24 cores and 64 GB of
RAM. For example, in the Mistral system, inventory tables contain detailed information about all the
installed equipment, its interconnections, management controllers, and localization. For instance, in
Table 3.2 we present a summary of equipment located in Mistral facility.
In the data center, resource allocation and accounting are maintained using Slurm3. This open
1https://www.dkrz.de/up/systems/mistral
2Ranking TOP500 June 2018 https://www.top500.org/system/178567
3https://slurm.schedmd.com/
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source Resource and Job Management System manages reservations performed by users, schedules jobs
and accounts the consumed resources. First, it allocates exclusive and non-exclusive access to resources
(compute nodes) to users. Second, it provides a framework for starting, executing, and monitoring work
(normally a parallel job) on the set of allocated nodes. Finally, it arbitrates contention for resources
by managing a queue of pending work. Optional plugins can be used for, e.g., accounting, advanced
reservation, topology optimized resource selection, resource limits by a user or bank account. Mistral
computing nodes are divided into several Slurm partitions: development, pre- and post-processing,
test, production. In this thesis, we analyze data from the production partitions.
According to the Mistral supercomputer, the most frequent errors are these associated with internal
job problems: source code bugs or wrong input format. The external causes are usually independent
for a job and in the majority, they are associated with Lustre system. Maintenance team spends most
of the troubleshooting time on Lustre problems, they might also debug particular jobs in a small-scale
system. Hardware problems, i.e., network, cooling infrastructure and computing nodes are sporadic.
Table 3.1: Computing nodes in Mistral
Node type Total quantity Homogeneous racks, 72 blades
B720 36 64 1454 20
B720 24 64 1404 19
B720 36 128 270 3
B720 24 128 110 1
B720 36 256 50 -
B720 24 256 48 -
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Table 3.2: Equipment in the data center other than nodes
Equipment Quantity Description
B720-bmc 3336 Blade Management Controller
BC-DLC-cmc 186 Chassis Management Controller
BCM-56224 186 Broadcom BCM-56224 Eth. Switch
FSB 186 Infiniband Switch
HYC-DLC-hyc 94 Hydraulic Chassis
SSU-CE9000 62 Disk Array
CPC-DLC-cpc 47 Cooperative Power Chassis
R-DLC-rmc 47 Rack Management Controller
SX6025 45 Infiniband Switch
ICX-6610-24 42 Eth. Switch
NSR423e4i-bmc 20 Blade Management Controller
NSR421e4-bmc 17 Blade Management Controller
MPX2-5530 12 Raritan, Power Distribution Unit
NODE-Xyratex-bmc 8 Blade Management Controller
NSR424e4-bmc 8 Blade Management Controller
3750-48 8 Cisco 3750-48 Eth. Switch
HYDRA-colddoor 6 Cold Doors
NSR425e4-bmc 4 Blade Management Controller
ADU 4 Disk Array
SX6536 3 Infiniband Switch
2960S-48 3 Cisco 2960-S-48 Eth. Switch
3750-24 2 Cisco 3750-24 Eth. Switch
SX6036 2 Infiniband Switch
CE2700 1 Disk Array
SG300-52 1 Cisco SG300-52 Eth. Switch
SG300-28 1 Cisco SG300-28 Eth. Switch
2960S-48-1 1 Cisco 2960-S-48 Eth. Switch
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3.2 Internet of Things stack
The rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and increasingly widespread use of mobile
and smart devices generating frequent data collection and exchange needs are forcing organizations to
change the way they engage customers, develop and deliver new products and services. Consequently,
data analytics is ubiquitous, bringing intelligence to every process [83]. According to Cisco, IoT will
unleash $19 trillion in new profits and cost savings globally in the next decade [84]. Besides, global data
center traffic will grow nearly 3-fold from 2014 to 2019, and by 2019, more than 86 percent of workloads
will be processed by cloud web services in data centers [85]. Regarding work about Big Data and IoT
frameworks in [86], data coming from IoT systems, e.g., smart cities, are characterized by a high
diversity of their structure, a high degree of variability, high velocity, and huge volume. Furthermore,
data are transformed and analyzed at different layers of a system, spreading from preprocessing in the
sensor microprocessors to data centers running data mining and deep learning applications.
Figure 3.1: Overview of IoT computing model in reference to [1] (Permitted for use)
A growing amount of data and the demand for their processing bring about new approaches and
paradigms in network and data centers infrastructure. Measurements and data coming from IoT
devices are not only processed in the cloud since the infrastructure and processing capabilities can be
insufficient. Fog computing handles the needs of, e.g., geographical distribution of resources, real-time
communication, incorporation with large networks. Through this paradigm, part of the processing is
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done by edge devices or clouds closer to data sources, resulting in less latency and bandwidth usage [87].
An example IoT stack can be seen in Figure 3.1.
For an efficient monitoring, troubleshooting and management of enormous IoT environments it is
necessary to provide a robust root cause analysis (RCA) mechanism which is scalable and tractable
enough to perform fast diagnosis on the whole system and will find explanations of the problems
whether they are located in the neighborhood of the particular device, other processing tier or they
are compound.
An essential aspect of the maintenance of IoT infrastructures is the connectivity between the
devices. The connections can be interrupted not only because of devices changing the localization and
consequently being out of network coverage. Devices can also disconnect due to power problems.
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3.3 Cloud and on-premise Big Data environments
Whether cloud or on-premise, Big Data applications deliver extensive business analytics and func-
tionalities with streams of data, large data volumes and different types of data. Big Data is used to
discover new correlations and patterns, which lead to valuable business insights.
In this thesis, we focus on two types of infrastructures that are: on-premise and cloud one. On-
premise infrastructure is linked to a scenario where an entity holds servers on site, maintaining them
physically and virtually. The cloud-based infrastructure represents emerging technologies of microser-
vices and scalable infrastructure where the resources are adjusted to the user demand.
3.3.1 On-premise Big Data cluster
We run Apache Spark and Hadoop on the following infrastructure. The cluster system comprises:
• 5x server: 32 GB RAM, AMD Opteron(tm) Processor 6168 (12 cores, 1.9 GHz), equipped with
IPMI card and running Ubuntu OS
• Switch D-link DGS-1210-48
• 2x Power Analyzer ZES Zimmer LMG450. The device is a 4-channel power analyzer mounted in
a rack and connected between each power supply and servers and the switch.
3.3.2 Cloud based infrastructure and microservices
Nowadays, microservices and containers are used as a cost-optimized, dynamic infrastructure for run-
ning web applications, databases, stream processing applications and others. We use Grid50004 to run
Docker5 containers. We use different software architectures and solutions. We describe them later on
in Section 5.4 where they are introduced for the experiments.
One of the most frequent and essential problems experienced in the distributed infrastructures is a
dead node problem. Usually, there might be many independent causes associated with a failure, both






SCALABILITY AND DYNAMISM IN ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND
DIAGNOSTICS BY MEANS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING
The number of applications of the Internet of Things, Cyber-Physical Systems, fog computing and large
data centers hosting cloud and web services is rapidly growing. The primary challenge of maintenance
and operations is not only the scale of these systems, but also their distribution, and dynamism.
In this Chapter, we present 2 new RCA systems. First, we propose a new root cause analysis
system. This system leverages the fact that the IT systems mentioned above usually contain a lot
of repeated elements. The proposed system is based on Bayesian reasoning and provides a novel
cache-based mechanism. We use Arithmetic Circuits as a computing structure which facilitates the
reasoning process. Thanks to the fact that ACs can be split into subparts, it enables the reuse of
previous computations to speed up the inference. The presented solution provides a fast RCA that
takes milliseconds when the system model changes, and it does it without the necessity to re-transform
the whole BN again into the ACs.
Then, we introduce ABRCA, an actor based root cause analysis which is a distributed, decentralized
and fault tolerant reasoning algorithm. It can use resources of the devices making up the system to
perform calculations that are necessary for root cause analysis. We evaluate the proposed algorithms
on the diagnostic models, which consists of millions of nodes, and simulate IoT devices exchanging
data with a data center. For ABRCA we simulate the behavior of the devices comprising an IoT
environment. Results show that the system can perform an order of magnitude faster, using fewer
resources.
Our contributions are:
• Root cause analysis system based on split Bayesian networks and their transformation that are
Arithmetic Circuits. The system leverages the fact that in large IT systems there are many
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repeated components, it manipulates Arithmetic Circuits and caches the partial results and
structures. The system scales to millions of nodes in a diagnostic model. (Section 4.2)
• Actor based root cause analysis system. The system uses the distributed resources of the devices
making up a system for root cause analysis calculations. The actor based model allows for the
implementation of different policies in case of failures. (Section 4.3)
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4.1 New root cause analysis methods for large-scale systems
Today, the growing popularity of the Smart City vision and its integration [88–90] with technical
domains such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) generates new chal-
lenges. The important ones are management, troubleshooting, and the control of these IT environ-
ments [91]. The software industry is forced to look for new solutions and algorithms for diagnostics
because of the huge complexity and the size of networks comprising intelligent devices. In particular,
the diagnostic solutions for these environments should be extraordinarily fast, accurate and automatic,
needing little human effort for operation.
Usual characteristics of Cyber-Physical Systems and IoT is that they consist of various intelligent
devices continuously connecting and disconnecting, e.g., because of switching a used network. This type
of behavior may be caused by device changing its localization, some failure or the loss of the connectivity
due to external conditions. As a consequence, diagnostic models are continuously changing, as they
should reflect the current structure of a system. Also, these models can change when the new devices
connect to the system, the hardware upgrades or the structure of a physical network changes.
While the considered systems change their structure rapidly, they push existing solutions to their
limits and make them difficult to react in time. For instance, a centralized diagnostic system might
not be reliable enough to provide fast and accurate troubleshooting. Also, the geographical dispersion
of these systems, in particular, CPSs, and their limited bandwidth reduces the system capability of
performing real-time diagnostics, especially when a system loses the connectivity with a part of it.
Thus, the analysis cannot frequently be performed with a satisfying level of accuracy, and the use of
little resources, i.e., having a memory utilization at the level of hundreds of megabytes for BN with
more than a million nodes.
Scalability and dynamism of diagnosed systems become the primary challenge to perform root
cause analysis effectively. We create a framework which can provide robust and automatic RCA
in distributed environments. We propose a new root cause analysis system that leverages the fact
that systems mentioned above usually contain a lot of repeated elements. The system is based on
Bayesian reasoning and provides a novel cache-based mechanism. We use Arithmetic Circuits as a
computing structure. Thanks to the fact that ACs can be split into subparts, it enables the reuse of
previous computations to speed up the inference. The presented solution provides a fast RCA when the
system model changes, without the necessity to recompile the whole BN. We evaluate our algorithm
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on a diagnostic model containing millions of nodes. The model simulates Internet of Things devices
exchanging data with a data center. In the evaluation we show that the proposed system performs an
order of magnitude faster.
The proposed system performs reasoning using Arithmetic Circuits which are compiled from Bayesian
networks and are much faster in the runtime. Thanks to the use of AC, we make it possible to ma-
nipulate AC computations and structures while a diagnostic model changes, without recompiling BNs.
We are also able to reuse compiled structures for different instances of the same diagnostic model.
Our contribution results in less memory footprint, faster diagnosis and better scalability of the diag-
nostic process compared to the use of other conventional systems, e.g., based on Case-Based Reason-
ing (CBR) [25]. In Section 4.2 we describe details of the proposed fast RCA for large environments.
Additionally, we introduce ABRCA, an actor based root cause analysis which is a distributed,
decentralized and fault tolerant reasoning algorithm. We focus on the aspect of dynamism: the
system size and connections between devices are frequently changed. The proposed solution uses
resources of the devices making up the system to perform calculations that are necessary for root
cause analysis. We describe this contribution in Section 4.3.
Then, we evaluate the proposed approaches. In Section 4.4, we evaluate RCA based on AC for a
large simulated environment of Internet of Things devices exchanging data with a data center. Then
in Section 4.5 we evaluate the performance of ABRCA in the conditions of devices connecting and
disconnecting simultaneously.
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4.2 Root cause analysis for large networks of devices through splitting, transforming
and reusing Bayesian networks
In this Section, we explain fast RCA method. As we know from the previous Section, root cause
analysis is a widely used method to identify causes of failures in a system. Tracking a causality
between events allows for the determination of the causes of failures. One of the successful frameworks
used for RCA is a probabilistic network method like Bayesian networks. One of the most significant
advantages of using Bayesian networks is that they perform accurate diagnosis even if information
about the system state is not complete. However, Bayesian Networks are expensive to calculate and
update, even when using improvements such as pre-compilation through Arithmetic Circuits. Such
scenario is usual in IoT and CPS environments where structure and network coverage changes. Also,
the aspect of many system structure changes will be more common, as long as the use of emerging
technologies, such as Software Defined Infrastructure [92,93] keeps growing. To perform accurate root
cause analysis, reasoning should be performed considering a large number of statistics, dependencies,
and observations. Including all these data results in the large size of a diagnostic model that is a
network of millions of nodes, and greater computational complexity.
Furthermore, the diagnostic system should be flexible enough to cope with these changes, reducing
recalculations as much as possible. Considering research in [94] on RCA using large Bayesian networks,
two important conclusions can be drawn: (i) network can be divided into clusters, i.e., sub-networks
which reduce calculation complexity and (ii) the root cause is usually in the neighborhood of the
observed failures.
In particular, we propose to take the steps of Algorithm 1 to calculate the root cause of a particular
system state.
Algorithm 1 Steps of the proposed root cause analysis method
1: Use Bayesian networks to create diagnostic models of a system
2: Create a model of a diagnosed system with the Probabilistic Relational Model paradigm
3: Identify repeatable system elements (objects) and split them for separate models (clusters)
4: Transform unique models defined as Bayesian networks to models based on Arithmetic Circuits
5: Evaluate these models given observations for each object. During the evaluation leverage cache
mechanism.
6: Join results of evaluations according to the hierarchy and defined diagnostic model of the entire
system. Leverage the construction of the Multi-linear functions (MLF).
In Figure 4.1 we present a high-level scheme of a traditional approach of root cause analysis. The
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system processes the stream of events (1) and uses defined model of the whole system to perform
root cause analysis. In Figure 4.2 we present the system based on traditional approach and compiled
models. The offline compilation is an additional step comparing to the system from Figure 4.1. A
compilation module (3) provides transformed diagnostic models to be used in an online evaluation. It
allows handling expensive resource calculations out of the runtime. Then, in Figure 4.3 we present
setup of the proposed RCA system that realizes steps described in Algorithm 1. It splits models of
system objects, compiles them separately and composes results to formulate the final hypothesis. Note
that in Figure 4.2 system description is to transform the diagnostic model of a whole system. In
contrast, in Figure 4.3 this description is used at the last step of calculating the RCA, to aggregate
results from split models.
Figure 4.1: Root-cause analysis traditional system dia-
gram
Figure 4.2: Traditional diagnosing system based on a com-
piled model
4.2.1 Bayesian networks and Arithmetic Circuits
According to work of Judea Pearl [6]:
Definition 1 Let U = {α, β, ...} be a finite set of elements, e.g., variables, and X, Y, Z stand for
three disjoint subsets of elements in U. Then, a dependency model M it is a rule that assigns truth
valuers to the three-place predicate I(X,Y, Z)M .
Definition 2 A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) D is said to be an I-map of a dependency model M if
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Figure 4.3: System diagram of the proposed system solution
every d-separation condition displayed in D corresponds to a valid conditional independence relationship
in M. i.e., if for every three disjoint sets of vertices X,Y,Z we have:
< X|Y |Z >D =⇒ I(X,Y, Z)M






E ) is a set of directed edges, is called a Bayesian network of P if D is a minimal I-map
of P.








where λb denotes evidence indicators for B and θb|a stands for parameters associated with its conditional
probability depending on the value of A.
Definition 5 An arithmetic circuit over variables U is a rooted, DAG whose leaf nodes are labelled
with numeric constants or variables in U and whose other nodes are labelled with multiplication and
35
addition operations. The size of an arithmetic circuit is measured by the number of edges that it
contains.
As explored earlier in Section 2.1, inference in Bayesian networks is resource expensive. Structures
which can be used alternatively are Arithmetic Circuits. Arithmetic circuits are introduced in [31],
and they are based on Multi-linear functions (MLF) which is created from a given Bayesian network.
In fact, an AC describes probability function of a BN, in a manner which facilitates calculations during
Bayesian inference.
The transformation of Bayesian networks to AC is done through the process of compilation. These
transformations do not cause loss of diagnostic accuracy, either sensitivity of the original model and
can be evaluated much faster. Then, compiled AC are evaluated to provide results of calculations. The
only disadvantage of using Arithmetic Circuits directly is that their size and topology are not making
it easy to be interpreted by an operator.
4.2.2 Most Probable Explanation as the result of root cause analysis
Discovering the root cause in the model based on BNs, it means to solve the problem of a calculation
of a Most Probable Explanation (MPE), which is defined as follows.
Definition 6 Most Probable Explanation (MPE). Given is evidence e which represents set of all
variables that are determined (observations). Computing an MPE is a problem of finding such an
explanation W = w∗, where W stands for the set of all variables considered, including those in e -
given evidence, in the Bayesian network, that maximizes the conditional probability P (w|e) [6]
P (w∗|e) = max
w
P (w|e)
The calculation of MPE is intractable and remains NP-hard, even if all variables are binary and
both outdegree and indegree of the nodes are at most two [95]. The problem can be partially solved
by limiting the size and the complexity of the network used for calculations. Our proposition is the
precompilation of the subnetworks of the replicated elements. Then we join them in a specific manner
that allows reusing computations and as a consequence an acceleration of the diagnosis of a huge
system.
In the proposed approach, we leverage the fact that, an Arithmetic Circuit can be easily transformed
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to the maximizer circuit, which is a structure designed to calculate MPE. This structure compared
to AC performs max operations instead of add ones. The complexity of the AC compilation process
time, as well as the inference, is O(n exp(w)), where n stands for the number of variables and w for
the tree-width of the transformed Bayesian network.
4.2.3 Transforming and splitting models
The proposed method follows the concept presented and proved in [25]. The root cause analysis is
realized through approximate reasoning performed on subnetworks of a diagnostic model. An example
Bayesian network is presented in Figure 4.4. The network has three nodes and each of the nodes
has two possible states B1 : {b11, b12}, B2 : {b21, b22} and A : {a1, a2}. These states could have any
arbitrary meaning like b11 being “B1 is working fine” and b12 being “B1 has a problem” for instance.






Figure 4.5: The Arithmetic Circuit for the example Bayesian Network with marked parts
corresponding to the B1 and B2 nodes
If states and conditional probabilities of nodes B1 and B2 are the same, there is no necessity to
compile the whole BN from Figure 4.4, but only consider the one shown in Figure 4.6 and then aggregate
computations from replicated nodes during the evaluation of the AC. The result of transformation BN
from Figure 4.6 into the AC can be seen in Figure 4.7. In Figure 4.7 the parts of the AC that are
replicated if more nodes of type B are added to the Bayesian Network from Figure 4.6 are marked.
It can be seen that, in the worst-case scenario, which is a system without replicated elements,
the complexity of the AC size grows as mentioned before. The proposed RCA framework prepares an
Arithmetic Circuit for each object type in a diagnosed system. Thus, the network representing a model
has lower complexity. Instead of compiling the whole system network, the compilation is only invoked
once for each component class of the system. Specifically, it means that if a system is composed of
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1000 components of the same type, only a single compilation for the component would be required,




Figure 4.7: The AC with multiply and max nodes for calculating MPE in Bayesian network on
Figure 4.6 with marked parts corresponding to the B node
We assume that the preliminary model of a system is not split. In such scenario, to include connec-
tions between components, specific Bayesian network nodes which are responsible for interconnection
are cloned from a parent component and placed in a referencing object (child component). This par-
ticular step is illustrated in an example model having two components, see Figure 4.8. After this
processing step, Component 2 contains one duplicated node coming from Component 1, as shown in
Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.8: Diagnostic model in form of BN, for two
components of different types
Figure 4.9: BN of Component 2 after its transforma-
tion, prepared for compilation into AC
Below, we present Algorithm 2 that performs RCA evaluation of models and aggregation of the
results. The input consists of (i) compiled diagnostics models - AC for each component type, including
a reference to the external nodes, (ii) system instances schema defining dependencies between specific
nodes of instances, number of instances of each component and their connections and (iii) set of
evidence (observations of a state). As a result, we receive marginal probabilities for each variable in
the diagnosed system.
We use the following notation:
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• I : single instance of a component
• I.S : nodes in instance I which are referenced to by other external nodes from other instances
(S stand for slots)
• I.P : nodes in instance I which are external nodes from other instances, thus in instance I ′ they
are cloned (P stand for plugs)
• I.N : internal nodes (including I.S)
• s.A : aggregated value of a node s, which is referenced by external nodes
• p.v : value of a node p
Algorithm 2 Pseudo code presenting an algorithm of calculation of a MPE for a given diagnostic
model. MPE is considered as the final outcome of root cause analysis
Input: Compiled models M , instances schema: Π, set of evidence e
Output: set of MPE for the whole diagnosed system
Initialisation : start with instances where I.S = ∅
1: for all devices I in Π do
2: key := (type(I), e, weights)
3: for all s in I.S do
4: assert s.A aggregated all summands
5: if not global cache contains value for key then
6: for all node s in I.S do
7: weight := s.A+log(s.probability)
8: add s.id → weight to weights map
9: end for
10: else
11: result := cache[key]
12: end if
13: end for
14: result := evaluate M[I] with e and weights
15: put key → result in cache
16: put I.N → result in the MPE set
17: for all nodes p in I.P do
18: let I’ stand for an instance where is a node that p was cloned from
19: assign values p.v to its referenced node I’.S for aggregation




4.3 Distributed root cause analysis through probabilistic self-diagnostics for dynamic
systems
In this Section, we propose an innovative diagnostic system to monitor a distributed and dynamically
changing environment. Actor Based root cause analysis (ABRCA) is an algorithm that performs RCA
by using distributable probabilistic reasoning through an actor model [96]. By taking advantage of
a supervision mechanism, the system can automatically handle faults that occurred while performing
root cause analysis. An exact policy on how the diagnostic process should be changed when the faults
have occurred can be defined per each device type.
The first significant novelty of the proposed system is that it leverages already available computa-
tional resources of the devices which make up the diagnosed system. It gives the system the ability
to self-diagnose. Consequently, this leads to the system decentralization and enables to diagnose it in
many critical situations, when information from the whole system cannot be retrieved. For instance,
while a connection problem or power outage is occurring, it can be possible to diagnose the system at
a level of subnetworks successfully. Also, despite a global failure in the system, local causes can be
found based on the observations and measurements coming from the neighborhood of devices. The sys-
tem is proven to work in a distributed and large-scale simulated environment, where devices exchange
messages asynchronously and in parallel.
4.3.1 Actor based root cause analysis (ABRCA)
In this research, the diagnostic models are defined as split Bayesian networks, and the reasoning
mechanism is implemented using Arithmetic Circuits. So, each split BN contains nodes representing
(1) internal states of a device, metrics, and failures; as well as (2) causality with a parent device. The
results of AC evaluations are exchanged between the devices to keep calculations coherent. Also, it
is possible to use other structures and evaluation algorithms, e.g., message passing algorithm such as
loopy belief propagation [97].
The first stage of ABRCA is a compilation of diagnostic models, defined as BNs, to ACs. This
operation requires significant resources for computations. The second stage is an online inference in
the compiled models, which outputs the MPE of the system state. A scheme of the proposed system
working in an IoT environment can be seen in Figure 4.10. This distributed system includes modules
responsible for the definition of a model, supervision, and evaluation. The model definition module
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stores current system structure, including the number of devices, their types, and interconnections.
Another module, the evaluator coordinates RCA and enables communication with the devices. The
supervision module works in each device’s actor and controls the execution of calculations and reacts
to failures which occurred during the runtime, e.g., restarts calculations in the region of devices where
the failure occurred. The behavior of the actor in case of failure is defined by supervising strategies,
which specify what kind of action should be taken in case of calculation failure.
Figure 4.10: Actor based root cause analysis (ABRCA) system scheme
Decentralized modules of the system are actors responsible for calculations performed in the devices.
The asynchronous communication between actors is based on instruction and calculation messages
which are sent between them. Each device is associated with actor instances accomplishing a particular
functionality, i.e., model compilation, model evaluation, management and delegation of diagnostic tasks
for the devices.
Using the actor model and its supervision mechanism results in the fault-tolerant solution during
the computations of the calculations. Resources in each device are used to execute compilation and
evaluation of Arithmetic Circuits, while regular processes are executed in the background. This ap-
proach enables to retrieve partial diagnosis, even if some components are not available. When devices
connect and disconnect simultaneously, the system changes its diagnostic model through creation or
destruction of the new actors. Once a new device connects, and its diagnostic model is already com-
piled, e.g., the same type devices exist in the system, it reuses the cached model. Otherwise, it starts
the compilation process. This event is communicated to the environment. Thus, other devices of a
particular type can save their resources and wait for the compilation result which is eventually used
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for diagnostics. Besides, after a specified timeout, each device starts the compilation independently.
This type of device behavior makes the system tolerant of either communication or calculation failures
which might occur during the compilation process.
Described ABRCA increases the overall execution time of the RCA system in the case when the
compilation time of a diagnostic model is much lower than a message delivery time. While only one
device of a particular type compiles the Bayesian network, the communication bandwidth is highly
consumed during the sharing of a result with other devices. On the other hand, when each device
compiles the model independently, the resources are highly consumed, in contrast to the connection
bandwidth which is less used. The ratio between devices compiling the model and waiting for the
compiled one should be set according to system characteristics. These characteristics are associated
with a cost of resources utilization, compilation time, which is related to the model complexity and
the communication bandwidth.
Once the RCA is executed, something that happens either automatically or through an external
request, devices perform inference in their models. All processes run asynchronously, so each device
starts the inference at the moment of receiving the request and has all necessary inputs to perform
calculations.
The communication between devices is designed as non-blocking. Once the message is sent, the
device is not waiting for the answer and can process other requests. Messages are produced as soon
as possible and without any dependency on the receiver state. For this reason, there is a necessity
to provide a robust solution for their processing considering a correct time order and the receiver’s
internal state. Therefore, a stash component is used, so all messages that arrive at the device and are
not processed at the moment are temporarily stashed in the queue. Thanks to this robust mechanism,
none of the messages is lost or processed at an inappropriate stage of the algorithm.
We present Algorithm 3 which formulates activities performed by each actor in the system.
In Figure 4.11 we present the state machine diagram representing the behavior of a device actor. It
depicts the evaluation of the diagnostic model of the whole system, whose result is the most probable
root cause of the given system observation. The starting state is the one in which the model is not
compiled yet, and the device has the connections established. The next states are associated with
model compilation and evaluation. If the device has children devices, before the evaluation, it has to
collect all the weights coming from these devices’ calculations.
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Algorithm 3 Pseudo code of different actions performed by ABRCA system while devices are con-
nected, and a system performs RCA
Input: set of observations O, system scheme S, set DM of Bayesian network diagnostic models for
each device type
Output: MPE for the whole diagnosed system
Initialisation :
1: for all device D in S do
2: send Start message to D
3: end for
Message handling :
4: switch (device D in S received message m):
5: case (D received Start):
6: D starts compilation of its diagnostic model DM [D.type]
7: end case
8: case (D finished compilation):
9: D sends compiled model DM to shared (centralized) resources
10: D changes internal state for ReadyForEvaluation
11: D broadcasts CompilationFinished message to ∀D′ ∈ S : D′.t = D.t
12: end case
13: case (D received CompilationFinished):
14: D changes internal state for ReadyForEvaluation
15: end case
16: case (D received RunRCA):
17: D sends Evaluate message to its engine actor D.E
18: end case
19: case (D.E received Evaluate):
20: if (D.E collected all calculation weights w from connected devices) then
21: evaluate D.E with input = {w, O[D]}

















































Figure 4.11: The state machine diagram representing behaviour of a device’s actor
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4.4 Evaluation: Exploring scalability of fast RCA
The first part of experiments aims to compare time and memory performance of the proposed fast
RCA with the existing reasoning approaches and validate RCA accuracy. We use a diagnostic network
that simulates large IoT network and data center environment, which is introduced in Section 3.2. It
simulates well the scale and the complexity of a real environment. For references, we take conventional
approaches that can be implemented in a simulator. Specifically, we compare our solution to (1)
the compilation of whole BN of diagnostic model into one Arithmetic Circuit and (2) Case-Based
Reasoning.
4.4.1 Implementation of the proposed system and methodology
We implement the fast RCA with Scala and Java, outputting a program to run in JVM. We use Ace
3.0 library for an efficient AC compilation and evaluation. We implement root cause analysis based
on Case-based Reasoning using FreeCBR library. Since calculated probabilities in huge networks are
small orders of magnitude, i.e., 10−100, it is necessary to use logarithmic calculation space, to avoid
interrupting the calculations by arithmetic underflow exceptions. Before invoking the appropriate code
of the program, we perform JVM warm-up to avoid overhead time of JIT compilations. Also, we call
Garbage Collector before each test. We run experiments for each particular model 5 times, and the
presented results are the average values. Experiments are run at the following configuration: SSD disk,
2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 - 4 cores, 16 GB RAM on Unix based OS. Maximum JVM heap size is 13 GB.
4.4.2 Results
The proposed approximate reasoning method is evaluated on the diagnostic model which is presented in
Figure 4.12. On this scheme, the prefix of a node label indicates the component type, i.e., S stands for
a server, D for an IoT device, E for edge device, G for global causes, R for a rack. Experiments are run
for the following quantity of devices: 20 servers per rack, 3 to 30 racks, 600 devices of 3 different types
per server, 1 edge router per 600 devices. Belief Propagation algorithm with a limit to 10 iterations
is run on the Bayesian network. This part is implemented with Figaro library, and the result is not
presented on the plots, because the evaluation of the model for the first iteration took 2855 s with a
maximum memory usage of 6 GB and the offline stage lasted for 130 s. The average quality of the
proposed cache-based RCA method is presented in Table 4.1. The results represent different quality
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metrics of RCA. We can see that the proposed system achieves high precision and true negative rate.
Also, the negative predictive value is at the satisfactory level of more than 70%.




Negative predictive value 0.73
True negative rate 0.99
Figure 4.12: Simplified Bayesian network presenting relations between events in different components. One instance of
each component type is shown only.
The following plots illustrate maximum memory consumption and time of online and offline stages
for the considered algorithms. In Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 we present performance results of the
offline stage concerning the size of the diagnostic model. The proposed solution is 2 orders of magnitude
faster than the compilation of the whole diagnostic model as the one Arithmetic Circuit. Also, the
memory used by the proposed solution is much smaller than the conventional AC compilation.
Then, Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 present performance results for the online stage (evaluation of
models and aggregation of results) with relation to the size of the diagnostic model. The proposed
solution is almost 10 times faster during this stage, and it uses 5 times less memory comparing to the
evaluation of one AC presenting the whole diagnostic model of a system. There is a trade-off between
memory consumption used for cache and memory necessary for the calculations as the system scales.
The proposed system with cache uses less memory than a version without cache. The explanation is
that storing a single result from the evaluation requires less memory than the memory is necessary for
the evaluation of a single compiled model. This feature manifests for networks larger than hundreds
of nodes.
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In Figure 4.17 we present the evaluation of the maximum memory usage during the reasoning stage
depending on the entropy of observations. For instance, the ratio of 60% means that we randomly set
60% of observations on the system variables, and 40% of them is fixed.
Figure 4.13: Time performance of offline stage (compi-
lation)
Figure 4.14: Maximum memory usage during offline
stage (compilation)
Figure 4.15: Evaluation (online stage) time
Figure 4.16: Evaluation (online stage) maximum mem-
ory usage
Figure 4.17: Maximum memory usage depending on observations entropy
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Summing up, results prove that excellent precision and specificity characterize the proposed method,
and acceptable enough sensitivity and negative predictive value. Also, it is about an order of magni-
tude faster in the evaluation and requires more than two times less memory compared to the accurate
approach with compilation the whole BN to a single AC.
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4.5 Evaluation: Exploring ability of ABRCA to deal with the dynamism of a diagnosed
system
4.5.1 Methodology and experiments
In this section, we evaluate ABRCA. We present our methodology followed by the results of the
evaluation. The performance of the algorithm is analyzed in both static and dynamic conditions. The
experiment simulates a large IoT and data center environment, and the model is built within the scale
and complexity of a real scenario. The example large-scale system which needs ABRCA can be a
data center cooperating with an IoT environment, described in Section 3.2. The data are pulled from
devices such as sensors, actuators, and smartphones through gateways to the data center to process
them in analytics applications.
The actor based root cause analysis is implemented in Scala1 using Akka2, which provides an actor
model framework, and Ace 3.03, which is responsible for Arithmetic Circuits compilation and inference.
The presented results are an average of 10 runs of the algorithm in the specified conditions.
Each of the devices in this scenario has defined the diagnostic model in the form of a Bayesian
network. For example, compilation, as well as evaluation of a BN having about 20 two-state nodes,
utilizes less than 2 MB of memory. The largest evaluated system consists of about 37k devices, and the
diagnostic model of the whole system comprises more than 186k nodes in the BN. Centralized RCA
with split Arithmetic Circuits running on the same resources is used as a baseline. Results of this part
of the experiment are presented in Figure 4.18.
Secondly, we evaluate the dynamics of ABRCA, while devices simultaneously connect to a system
during its normal operation. The effectiveness of ABRCA can be explored by measuring the time
needed to connect and prepare diagnostic models for the new set of devices being added to the diagnosed
system. The results can be seen in Figure 4.19.
4.5.2 Results
We have evaluated the performance of ABRCA to decide if it would cope with the conditions of a





be seen in Figure 4.18 comparing performance results obtained from 8 and 12 cores machines. It is
observed in the same figure, that the evaluation of ABRCA is 3 times faster than the approach with
centralized and non-distributed split Arithmetic Circuits. However, the compilation phase is slower
than the one with the centralized approach. The reason is the communication overhead, while some
of the devices compile a diagnostic model and some wait for the compilation result to be delivered
from another device the same type. In Figure 4.19, we can see the time performance of connecting
new devices to the system. The measured time includes exchanges of the compiled models between
the devices for different model sizes.



















compilation 8 cores - baseline
evaluation 8 cores - baseline
Figure 4.18: Performance of ABRCA - models compilation and evaluation run on different resources














Connecting new devices to the existing system
BN of 1 device type - 4 nodes
BN of 1 device type - 7 nodes
Figure 4.19: Performance of ABRCA - time for system to be ready and perform diagnostics - new devices are connected
to the system which initially contains 30k devices
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4.6 Discussion, conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we proposed a novel actor based root cause analysis algorithm, which fills the gap
between two emerging research areas. These are distributed self-diagnostics solutions available for
wireless sensor networks and complex centralized RCA systems used in data centers. The cutting-edge
design and abilities of ABRCA are ideal as a core for the future RCA systems working with CPS
which consists of smart devices pushing data into the cloud. In the future research, the interesting
direction can be the deployment of ABRCA on the real IoT infrastructure, e.g., this provided by IoT-
LAB4. It will enable to utilize wireless sensors, robots and other intelligent devices which are dispersed
in Europe in several laboratories. In this case, each device in the environment will have to handle
model compilation, evaluation, and communication with other devices. Then an interesting research
branch might be an intelligent system for management of resources delegated to perform ABRCA.
Also, an automatic benchmarking system to self-adapt the optimal ratio between devices waiting for
the compiled model and compiling one on their own can be considered.
Further research in the area is focused on the deployment of the fast RCA system for efficient
diagnostics in Big Data systems for the smart city. Another significant step to take is the creation of
a new compilation algorithm for Bayesian networks to leverage repeated structures and improve the
accuracy of the method proposed in this thesis. It will be achieved by more complex analysis of the





KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION AND RE-USABILITY FOR ROOT CAUSE
ANALYSIS
Systems and their architecture change very rapidly in response to business and user demand. Many
organizations see value in the maintenance and management model of NoOps. The path to NoOps
involves not only precise and fast diagnostics but also reusing as much knowledge as possible after the
system is reconfigured or changed. The biggest challenge is to leverage knowledge on one IT system and
reuse this knowledge for diagnostics of another, different system. We propose a framework of weighted
graphs which can transfer knowledge and perform high-quality diagnostics of IT systems. We encode
all possible data in a graph representation of a system state and automatically calculate weights of
these graphs. Then, thanks to the evaluation of similarity between graphs, we transfer knowledge
about failures from one system to another and use it for diagnostics. We successfully evaluate the
proposed approach for Spark, Hadoop, Kafka and Cassandra systems.
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5.1 Weighted graph framework unifying system information for automatic knowledge
transfer
Today’s IT systems are large, dynamic, complex, and heterogeneous. The current and the future
systems will frequently change their architecture and resources according to the business and user
demand. Diagnosing them efficiently in satisfactory time (less than minutes) is already not within
reach of even the most experienced operators. Because of that, the majority of trends and efforts
around the development of troubleshooting and diagnostics of IT systems is driven by NoOps123
business model [98]. NoOps stands for no operations. It means a scenario of fully automated and self-
manageable IT infrastructure. The shift of conventional operations to NoOps model is achieved by the
full automation of maintenance activities, including failure diagnostics. In this model of maintenance,
problems occurring in an IT system are solved immediately without any human intervention.
However, to operate successfully in such a business model, the future diagnostic systems should
not only perform precise, automated and fast root cause analysis. These solutions should be able to
diagnose problems even in a scenario where there is none or few data about failures and their causes. In
many cases, recollecting the data necessary for diagnostics is expensive or even impossible. The use of
similar data coming from another system with a different structure is a solution, but it is a considerable
challenge. The solutions based on transfer learning can transfer and reuse as much knowledge on the
behavior of a system as possible to keep pace with the changing architecture, infrastructure and rapidly
growing number of knowledge domains.
So far, we have seen enormous work on automated diagnostics of IT systems, with use of data mining
or Artificial Intelligence (AI) [99, 100]. Most of this work uses either metrics or logs for diagnostics.
When both are used, the use of logs is limited to counting specific key terms or entries with a specific
severity level. Another common limitation of current systems is the lack of inclusion of detailed
system information, i.e., connectivity, hardware specification in diagnostics. There is still room for
improvement in knowledge integration and knowledge transfer before we reach the era of NoOps. As
we show in this chapter, integrating log entries, metrics, and other system data improves the accuracy
of the diagnostics for IT systems.





evaluation of weighted graphs with multi-attribute nodes. The framework uses logs, metrics, configura-
tion and connectivity information to represent the state of a system as a graph. Then, the framework
evaluates the similarity between an abnormal state and a collection of previously diagnosed states.
By finding the most similar graph in the solution space, we can classify the anomaly and provide a
root cause. Moreover, we use automatically calculated weights to highlight the system metrics that
better describe a failure. Finally, we use the framework for a cross-system failure classification. By
acquiring a collection of diagnosed anomalies for one system architecture, we can establish the root
cause of anomalies that occur in a completely different architecture (cross-system diagnostics). We
leverage the proposed framework for the problem of rapidly changing system architecture as a con-
sequence of changed business or user demands and requirements. Thanks to the knowledge transfer,
just after starting a new architecture of a system, we can diagnose it and proactively avoid failures.
The proposed system does not only allow for precise diagnostics but also helps in proactive avoidance
of failures. The system can output the nearest possible future failure as a result of graph similarity
evaluation. Such an approach, saves time, effort and results in performance and reliability advantage
over competitors.
We evaluate the proposed framework in the environments running representative and different Big
Data applications such as Spark [2] and Hadoop [3]. We inject failures into these environments and
evaluate the quality of failures classification, reaching more than 70% of both f1-score (the harmonic
mean of precision and recall) and accuracy. Then, we perform experiments using different architectures
with containers running Cassandra [5] and Kafka [4] systems. We evaluate our cross-system nearest
root cause classification when the symptoms of failures are known only for one of these systems. We
obtain average f1-score 77% with the same level of accuracy.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 5.2 we describe the back-
ground for the graph similarity calculation. Then we present the framework for creation and similarity
evaluation of automatically weighted graphs representing a system’s state that contains: metrics, logs,
system connectivity, infrastructure. Our contributions are:
• A solution on how to include logs in a graph representation of a system state. (Subsection 5.3.1)
• A method for automatic adjustment of weights of nodes and node attributes, according to the
distribution of a metric. (Subsection 5.3.2)
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• Evaluation of the proposed solution on real datasets for root cause classification. This Section
presents an evaluation of the proposed framework on a cluster running Hadoop and Spark jobs.
We prove that including logs and the automatic importance assignment system increases the
accuracy of the classification with respect to other methods. (Section 5.4)
• Evaluation of root cause classification in cross-system transfer learning; We search for a failure
using knowledge captured from one system (Kafka) and utilize it in another system (Cassandra).
We prove that the graph approach can transfer knowledge to/from Cassandra from/to Kafka.
(Section 5.5)
Both evaluation sections contain results from total four use cases running in different infrastruc-
tures: on-premise cluster and containers in a cloud. This strategy allows us to prove the reproducibility
and broad usability of the proposed framework. We conclude the paper with the discussion and plans
for future research in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Similarity between weighted graphs having multi-attribute nodes
In this section, we provide background knowledge on the problem of similarity calculation between
graphs. We define the problem, the graph representation, and how to calculate similarities between
different node attribute types.
Definition 7 We define a multi-attribute weighted graph G as an ordered tuple of (E, V,W,A, S) that
comprises a set of edges E; set of vertices V ; set of weights W that are defined for each attribute, vertex,
and edge; set of attributes A that are defined for edges and nodes; and a set of similarity functions for
different attribute types.
The similarity measure is an intuitive number giving the idea of how two objects are similar to each
other. There are many metrics used, usually such measures are the inverse of distance metrics, e.g.,
s(x, y) = 1/distance(x, y), s(x, y) = 1− distance(x, y). The greatest the distance in a metric space is,
the less similar compared objects are. According to [43], we define the problem of finding a similarity
between two graphs as follows.
Definition 8 For given two graphs G1 and G2 find an algorithm to calculate the similarity s of the
graphs, which returns the maximum number between 0 and 1. Two graphs have similarity s = 1 only
when they are identical while a similarity value of 0 intuitively says that they are completely different.
Calculating the similarity between the two graphs is a non-obvious problem, especially when the
topology of graphs and attributes of nodes are different. Many combinations of node and edge similarity
calculation are possible. To find the maximum similarity between the graphs, it is necessary to solve
the following optimization problem.
Definition 9 We define the mapping as injective functions: for nodes – mn : V1 → V2 returning the
matched node of G1 into G2 and for edges – me : E1 → E2 returning the matched edge of G1 into G2
Then we can define the optimization problem.
Definition 10 The optimization problem is to find the mapping that maximizes the similarity between





















The above formula states that the similarity is the weighted average of the similarities between the
optimally mapped elements of the graph through the mapping functions mn and me. The weights of
nodes (w(v) +w(mn(v))) and edges (w(e) +w(me(e))) can help in increasing importance of the nodes
and edges that are critical for a particular graph representation.
5.2.1 Approximate Graph Similarity Calculation
Graph representation of a system state. Graphs allow representing an IT system state including
all types of data which can describe that state. Each of the system components is a node that has
multiple attributes and represents a different level of abstraction, e.g., hardware, server, an application,
application module, application thread, container, or a microservice. Edges represent the connectivity
between system components. Attributes of a node contain different information encoding the system
state, e.g., metric value, log entries, component type, software details.
Also, to represent the different importance of each of the attributes, we introduce weights at each
level of the graph structure. We use them with each element of a graph: edges, nodes and node
attributes. A weight indicates how significant is the influence of the similarity between particular
elements on the final similarity result. An expert can define weights through the root cause analysis
framework. When an anomaly is detected inside the system state graph, the expert can pinpoint
the metrics and components that are more important inside that anomaly. These will be later used
as inputs by the root cause classification system. Such an intuitive mechanism creates permanent
opportunities for the framework to gather the expert knowledge. In Section 5.3, we introduce the
automatic weight calculation mechanism.
Graph similarity calculation. We calculate the maximum similarity s(G1, G2) between two
graphs G1 = (E, V,W,A, S) and G2 = (E, V,W,A, S). We use hill climbing [101] to solve the above
optimization problem. The similarity between two nodes is calculated by using their attributes, which
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can be both logs and metrics. In the Subsection 5.2.2 we propose different similarity functions depend-
ing on the attribute types - custom functions to compare different elements of a graph.
5.2.2 Similarity between different attribute types
We define similarity functions for numerical, vector, categorical and ontological attributes in Table 5.1.
Thanks to the different similarity functions, we manage the calculation of similarities between different
attribute types, coming from the two compared graphs.
Table 5.1: Similarity functions used in the proposed framework
Type of attributes Similarity function
Numerical 1 − scaled distance(a1, a2)
Vector cos(a1, a2); inverse Euclidean distance; Minkowski p distance
Categorical 1 if a1 == a2 else 0
Ontological
Modified Wu and Palmer [102] similarity metric:
2·d(C)
d(c1)+d(c2)
c1 and c2 – concepts in the ontology, C – their closest common ancestor,
d(c) – distance from the root node
Similarity between numerical attributes. This function is used for those metrics that take numerical
values such as CPU usage, bytes written to disk or memory used to name a few. More specifically, for
numerical type attributes a1 and a2, we use the formula s(a1, a2) = 1 − |a1−a2||max−min| . Two points that
are close on the scale, will have a higher similarity value. They achieve the maximum similarity (value
of 1 ) only if they are equal.
Similarity between vectors. Vectors can represent a measurable state of a system module, but can also
represent text inside a log file, as we will explain in Subsection 5.3.1. The similarity between vectors
is usually defined by the value of cosine between two vectors. Also, other metrics that are based on
different distance formulas can be used.
Similarity between types. Graph nodes contain attributes which specify a type. A taxonomy is a
tree that represents a hierarchy of concepts in a given domain. In Figure 5.1, we present an example
taxonomy. Each node in a graph can contain attributes that define its type inside this taxonomy. A
function used for similarity calculation between types, given taxonomy is introduced in Table 5.1.
Similarity between categories. They take values that are names or labels, e.g., the image of a Docker
container (e.g., Haproxy, WordPress), disk label, hardware model. According to the categorical values,
the similarity is 1 when the values are equal, otherwise 0.
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Figure 5.1: An example taxonomy defining equipment type used in the evaluation. For instance, using the on-
tological similarity formula from Table 5.1: similarity(Master, Slave) = 0, 66, similarity(Master, Switch) = 0, 4,
similarity(Server, Switch) = 0, 5
.
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5.3 Weighted graphs representing system state for cross-domain diagnostics
Motivated by the challenge of shifting operations to NoOps, we present the following contribution.
First of all, we propose a diagnostic framework based on an automatic similarity calculation for graphs
representing a system state. The framework automatically adjust graph weights according to the
distribution of historical values of metrics. Also, the weight module allows for adjusting the importance
of a metric according to an operator’s feedback. Weights are used to indicate the important elements
of a system which hold significant information for diagnostics. For instance, in case of a network
failure, attributes with network metrics and a switch may have more importance and anomalous
information than, e.g., CPU load or temperature. The framework reacts to a trigger based on anomaly
detection mechanisms, e.g., an error message, exceeded the threshold of a metric. It outputs the
similarity score between the current state of the system and previously acquired anomalous states.
Such information can be used for early detection of failures and their prevention. In Figure 5.2, we
present an automatically weighted graph representing a system state. Blue nodes represent system
elements, in this case: hosts, and a switch. Each node contains many attributes which can contain
static information, e.g., node type, and runtime data, e.g., metric values, metric distributions. In
comparison with state of the art (Section 2.2), in our approach for the cross-system diagnostics, we
encode more information. We use attributes of different types in both edges and nodes, together with
the information contained in system and application logs, providing a much more detailed input for
the graph similarity function. Also, analyzed state of the art shows the dependency between accuracy
and the underlying complexity of the solutions. Much state of the art research is focused on accurate
analysis and mining of logs based on metadata for a specific log structure. There are not many solutions
which diagnose a system just by consuming logs without specific preprocessing techniques. With the
solution that we propose, we would like to fill this gap. The solution is as general as possible, and it
can work with many IT system types with little human effort to deploy the framework.
In Figure 5.3, we present the proposed framework for root cause classification. The framework
manages the creation of weighted graphs and calculation of similarity between them. One graph comes
from a repository with anomalous graphs that have been previously labeled with its root cause, and
the other one represents an anomalous state of a diagnosed system. Note that we assume the existence
of an external anomaly detection system that can extract anomalous system graphs. An expert can
label these graphs in the repository, or they can be labeled automatically by an anomaly detector.
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Figure 5.2: An example graph with multi-attribute nodes representing a system state, including connectivity between
devices their types, metrics, and logs. Each node contains many attributes, which are different types: categorical,
numerical, vector, distribution, classification.
The graph creator builds graphs that represent the system state. They use sources of data coming
from different monitoring systems or other information about the system architecture. The content of
graphs and their topology depends on the modeling approach. For instance, each node can represent
a server, application or its module. The graph similarity module is used to find in a solution space
the nearest graph to the anomalous system state graph. By finding this closest labeled graph, we can
know the cause of a failure. In case of use of the proposed framework for failure prevention, we get a
graph representing the most probable failure which is likely to occur.
Figure 5.3: Scheme presenting the architecture of the root cause classification framework working with an external
anomaly detection system.
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5.3.1 Including log data
In this subsection, we propose a log representation structure that can be embedded into our graph. In
the proposed graph representation of a system state, the attributes capture information from different
sources, including logs. In contrast to many state of the art solutions, we consume logs without
any metadata or dependency on its structure. Thanks to this approach, our solution is agile and
needs a minimal effort for the deployment. We only extract timestamp, severity level, and the rest
is treated as a log entry that includes application module name, message, thread name, and other
fields. Moreover, users (framework operators) can disassemble logs by modules and put them inside
new nodes or attributes representing these modules in a system state graph. For instance, an operator
deploying the proposed framework may decide that the graph representation of a system should be
a detailed one. Then, a node presenting a host is connected with its child nodes, representing some
modules, e.g., threads, classes, application modules. Logs of this host are split among these nodes.
We propose to use vectorized logs using Word2Vec models, in a system’s state representation for
the following reasons. The whole log processing is a simple algorithm and includes removal of special
chars, sequences, and stop words, tokenization, and vectorization. The scheme illustrating the whole
process is presented in Figure 5.4.
Filtering. After eliminating special char sequences e.g., hex strings, the vocabulary in logs is
limited. Typically, human-created templates of logs do not contain synonyms, just strict and simple
phrases. After this stage, log entries contain less noise and represent a state of the generalized system,
rather than a particular case. Also, removing special characters helps to avoid model over-fitting. This
step does not only improve the model quality but also transforms a log into a universal form, which is
mandatory in cross-system diagnostics.
Tokenization. The tokenization step disassembles sentences into bags of words.
Vectorization. Thanks to Word2Vec we transform log into vectors. The vectorization stage enables
to represent log entries in relatively small models, what we show later in the evaluation in Section 5.4.
Firstly, it is necessary to create a model mapping the vocabulary into n dimensional space. The
performance of a model depends on its configuration parameters and the size of the vocabulary used for
training. A considerable advantage of using a Word2Vec embedding model is that it performs well even
if it is trained using the vocabulary of one domain and used for another one. Also, similarity calculations
should be as fast as possible to enable diagnostics of failures in a dynamic environment. Hence, it is not
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feasible to use natural language processing (NLP) techniques such as key terms extraction using rank
algorithms for each log sentence as we demonstrate in Section 5.4, where we test different approaches.
The proposed log processing algorithm does not need much configuration work. We only need to
adjust a time window size, which starts with a specific severity type. In this chapter, we propose to
use severities with a higher level than the warning one.
Figure 5.4: An example process of transformation log entries to vectors using Word2Vec. After this transformation,
each log entry is represented (embedded) by a vector in a continuous model space. A vector of a log entry is computed
as the average vector from all vectors representing words in this entry.
After a failure occurs, we can find messages on the logs containing information for that failure, while
some others are just messages belonging to the usual operation of the system components. As discussed
in [103], using smaller time windows capture the more detailed meaning of a word (in our case, if it
mentions a failure), and large ones which capture the context (general context of the application used).
We propose to use two log windows: one called (1) context window, and the other one (2) event
meaning window. The context window represents the general state of a part of the system. Mainly,
it enables to capture application’s normal activities. The event meaning window captures log entries
in a shorter time after a particular event. Logs in such a window represent specific information about
the event. Both windows start when an error or warning message is written into the log. The reason
we take this approach is that operators usually do not know when the system starts failing, but they
know the precise time of every error or warning written to logs. We explain the concept of window
lengths in Figure 5.5.
5.3.2 Using metrics distribution for automatic weighting of node attributes and measur-
ing similarity
The distribution of values for a metric can be used to know how different or uncommon is a value
observed in the system. In this subsection, we explain how we use the cumulative distribution function
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Figure 5.5: Scheme presenting context window and event meaning window used for extraction of logs. Metric window
is used for extraction of metrics. Both windows start on a first Error or Warning message.
to our advantage by, firstly, calculating weights automatically inside the graph representation, and
secondly, comparing two numerical attributes considering the distribution of their historical values.
Automatic weighting of node attributes
There are two ways of defining weights in graphs which represent the importance of the different
elements of the system status.
Firstly, thanks to the weight assignment mechanism, operators adjust the importance of a par-
ticular metric in the graph representation based on their expert knowledge of a failure. For instance,
operators might put a higher weight on the CPU load than on the disk I/O, for a problem related to a
system overload. Thanks to this approach, we do not require operators to know specific characteristics
or deviations of metrics. We use a part of their expertise which contains importance of metrics used
in a troubleshooting process.
The second possibility for weight assignment in graphs is an automatic weight calculation from
available metric data.
In this subsection, we focus on the latter. We propose an automatic weight assignment mech-
anism to automatically assign the importance of an attribute, given its distribution.
According to the troubleshooting activities of IT operators, the more abnormal the attribute value
is the better describer of a particular failure. In this case, we define weights which are proportional
to the deviation of the usual value for an attribute distribution of values. Again, using the normal
distribution X ∼ N (µ, σ2), we have the following definition.
Definition 11 The weight of a numerical attribute which is proportional to the deviation of a metric
value a is defined as w(a) = |a−µ|σ
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Measuring similarity from metric distributions
The similarity function based on metric distribution enables to utilize data containing historical val-
ues for an attribute. The function definition contains cumulative distribution function (CDF) and
its parameters. We define the similarity function between two numerical attributes, as the formula
similarity = 1− distance where distance is the difference between CDF values of attributes. For the
normal distribution used in the proposed framework, we have the following definition.
Definition 12 Given numerical attributes a1, a2 from two graphs and distribution of these attributes
X ∼ N (µ, σ2), their similarity is provided with the formula similarity = 1− |φµ, σ2(a1)− φµ, σ2(a2)|
The above two simple mechanisms allow to automatically include the importance of attributes in
the graph representation of a system state and similarity calculation.
5.3.3 Enabling cross-system diagnostics
Finally, we use the proposed framework to transfer knowledge about failures from one system that we
call source system to another that is called target system. In Figure 5.6, we present the cross-system
knowledge transfer problem. A source system and a target system can have both different topologies
and contents of nodes. We use the proposed graph representation of system states as a medium to
transfer knowledge about failures. Then, thanks to the framework, we can compare two states of
different systems and calculate the maximum similarity of these states. In the final step, we find the
nearest graph, which best describes a target system state by knowledge coming from a source system.
In details, using our framework, knowledge transfer is possible because of:
1. Calculation of the maximum similarity between two graphs with different structures using dif-
ferent similarity functions (Subsection 5.2.2). The framework finds the maximum similarity by
matching proper subgraphs. Also, defining a taxonomy allows for the calculation of the similarity
between two nodes that are different but represent the same concept in a domain. For instance,
a slave server of Spark and a data node of Hadoop are close to each other inside the taxonomy,
because they are both slaves in a master-slave architecture.
2. Inclusion of logs in the graph representation, as they describe in natural language events that
happen in the system, independently of their architecture or resource usage (Subsection 5.3.1).
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The two log windows (context and event) contain universal descriptive information, no matter
what the differences are between the topologies and components of the two system graphs.
3. Including the information contained in the distribution of the metrics for a given architecture.
We do it through the automatic weight assignment and the similarity function based on the
distance between distributions (Subsection 5.3.2). The metric values registered for the source
and target system can be very different depending on their resource usage patterns. Calculating
weights and measuring the similarity using their distributions, allows for a better comparison
between two different systems.
Figure 5.6: Scheme illustrating an idea of cross-system graph comparison
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5.4 Evaluation: Root cause classification through finding the nearest graph
In this Section, we show through a series of experiments the quality of our proposed root cause classifi-
cation framework. We evaluate different features of the framework and compare them to representative
and popular state of the art techniques. We use a f1-score metric which both includes recall and preci-
sion. In this Section, we evaluate the quality of the framework in a scenario where the source and the
target system is the same. For this task, we use two use cases: a Spark cluster and a Hadoop cluster.
We evaluate cross-system diagnostics in Section 5.5, using Kafka and Cassandra systems.
5.4.1 Experimental methodology
Experimental environment. In the first set of experiments, we use an on-premise cluster described
in Section 3.3.1. The monitoring system acquires 22 metrics representing the system state, such as
CPU total load: idle, iowait, softirq, system, user; disk: bytes read, bytes write, IO
read, IO write; memory: buffer cache, free, map, used; network: received bytes, received
packets, send bytes, send packets, and processes: load10, load15, load5, number of running
processes. The power meters acquire energy consumption of the servers and the switch. The probing
period is set to 5 seconds. The monitoring system works on InfluxDB4 stack and we use ElasticSearch5
stack for log storage.
Workloads. During the experiments, we generate Hadoop and Spark workloads using HiBench [104].
We use workloads such as sort, word count, k-means clustering, Bayesian classifier. Each workload
takes from 20 min to 2h. Random workloads run continuously.
5.4.2 Types of injected failures and anomalies
We inject different failures in the experimental environment. Each of the described failures is injected
20 times. We choose a set of failure types which are representative and well-aligned with use cases in
real environments. Also, different failures should manifest exclusive symptoms in different metrics and
logs. The next criterion of choosing the failure types is that they should differentiate possible scenarios
of lacking data that are often caused by connectivity problems.




• High CPU load. Background process running CPU pattern of 100% load for 90% of server
cores. This failure simulates a scenario of a node slow-down, caused by e.g., an unfinished job,
unwanted or unfinished process. CPU performance degradation can also simulate a failure of one
of many workers in a Big Data cluster.
• High disk load. Random write and read operations on a 10 GB file, generated with the FIO
utility6. This failure simulates a scenario of a failed disk in a disk array. Thanks to this failure
type we can observe many HDFS errors.
• High network transfer. 20 threads are uploading and downloading 5 GB files. It simulates
significant network slowdowns, which can occur as a result of network infrastructure failure.
• Host shutdown. Immediate node shutdown through IPMI card. It simulates a node crash, a
sudden and unexpected failure of the whole machine.
• Network failure. Physical disconnection.
The symptoms of failures have an understandable impact on system metric values. As we mentioned
before, we include power metrics of the servers and the switch. Regarding the switch power, we can
observe different peaks and power values depending not only on the network transfer but also on the
connection and disconnections. In Figure 5.7 we present the switch power distribution depending on
the injected failure, and the referential distribution for the system running random workload without
any failure injected. We can observe that different power consumption values characterize different
failures. These distributions increase the quality of failure classification in similarity evaluation. For
instance, high disk load manifests in a low switch power consumption, while high network use manifests
in significantly higher median value.
To evaluate the quality of the root cause classification, we use f1-score metric that is defined as
follows.
Definition 13 Let TP stand for number of true positives in multi-class classification task, then FP
stands for false positives. We define recall (true positive rate) as TPP , and precision as
TP
TP+FP . Then











Figure 5.7: An impact of different failure types on the power consumption of a switch. In random workload no failures
are injected. Intuitively, average power consumption for net failure is one of the highest because of connection and
disconnection events, while for high network use switch has to handle the abnormal traffic. Most probably, influence of
high CPU usage on switch power consumption can be explained by higher number of connections generated by a node,
one some processes are blocked.
5.4.3 Evaluation: Leveraging logs for root cause classification
We evaluate different methodologies and their configurations for the use of logs for the classification
task. In the evaluation, we present the result of solving the following problems.
• Model training vocabulary. We fit Word2Vec models using different vocabulary. It can be a
specific vocabulary for a particular domain or a general dictionary e.g., English one. For instance,
we can train such a model with logs from Spark cluster and use this model to vectorize Hadoop
logs.
• Model size. We evaluate different numbers of dimensions of a vocabulary space (vector size).
• Key terms extraction. We compare the performance of the use of the whole available log
entries with the key terms describing the system state.
• Log window length. Size of the window is a trade-off between generalization of logs and
capturing precise event information. Taking to much text can fuzzify the meaning of the event,
and opposite, taking too little text can mangle an analyzed system state. We evaluate different
window lengths for both event and context windows.
We create Word2Vec models with the process described in Subsection 5.3.1 evaluating different
vector size and vocabulary used for model training. In Figure 5.8, we see average f1-scores of the
failure classification for the two use cases: the Spark and Hadoop cluster. We present only the best
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Figure 5.8: Plot presenting the quality of root cause classification depending on the number of dimensions used in
Word2Vec model, and the training vocabulary source. Log window length: 30 s
results achieved during the evaluation of different log window sizes. Also, we present summarized
results of vector size evaluation. For vector sizes between 3 and 80 f1-scores does not change much.
In the Figure 5.8, the inner groups stand for the source of the vocabulary used for model training. As
well as for Hadoop and Spark, the classification performs the best when the same vocabulary is used
for model training and vectorization. For both use cases, the models perform well with small vector
sizes - 3 for Hadoop and 2 for Spark.
Figure 5.9: Plot presenting root cause classification quality depending on the mechanism used. Average f1-score is
calculated from all of the injected failures. The proposed framework performs better than state of the art solutions
(Word2Vec).
In the next step, we test different approaches of extracting information from logs and representing
it in graphs. For the first approach, we use Word2Vec, as described above. In the second approach, we
use SGRank [105] algorithm to extract key terms which best describe a system state. This algorithm
combines statistical methods, e.g., TF-IDF, with graph-based approaches of key terms. In Figure 5.9,
we confirm that using the whole text is the best method to represent the log meaning [80].
71
5.4.4 Evaluation: Root cause classification via similarity of weighted graphs
In this subsection, we present the results of evaluation of the root cause classification. We test four
different configurations of the proposed framework and compare them with the state of the art methods.
We show how augmenting the dataset used for the classification task improves its performance. In
Figure 5.9, we present the results of the evaluation: average f1-score and accuracy. Average f1-
score is calculated over all of the injected failures. In evaluations where it is emphasized that we use
automatic attribute importance assignment, we utilize both similarity function based on distribution
and automatic weight calculation. In others, we use equal weights in a graph.
We can see that the proposed framework that contains context and event log window and automatic
attribute importance calculation performs better than state of the art methods. Considering perfor-
mance for two use cases, graphs with automatic weights reveals the best performance. Regarding the
Hadoop use case, accuracy reaches 0.72, and f1-score reaches 0.71. As for the Spark use case, f1-score
is a little bit lower 0.61 and accuracy 0.71.
We evaluate the proposed framework for different event and context window lengths. In Figure 5.10,
we present detailed results of this evaluation. The performance changes smoothly, there are local
maxima of f1-score. These maxima show balance points between log generalization and extraction of
precise information about a particular event. The greater is log window length, the more fuzzified
information about an event is held in the analyzed window. Note that for Spark, there is also local
minimum of 0.51 for event window length of about 10 s and context window length of 60 s. Most
probable explanation of this minimum is the timeout for idle executor which is set by default to 60 s.
Figure 5.10: Plot presenting quality of failure classification via graphs with equal weights depending on the log window
sizes. Average f1-score is calculated from all of the injected failures.
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In Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 we present detailed evaluation results for each of the injected failures.
We compare the use of logs with the proposed framework comprising automatically weighted graphs.
The proposed framework performs significantly better than Word2Vec, especially with the classification
of high CPU load and host shutdown. There is no observable difference in the performance of the
proposed framework when used for the Spark or Hadoop use case. The exception is high network
transfer, which is classified well only for Hadoop by both Word2Vec and the proposed framework.
High network transfer manifests in characteristic log entries for Hadoop, and for Spark only in network
metrics. Also, it is important to emphasize that, received results come from similarity evaluation of
graphs created automatically without any weight adjustment by a human.
Figure 5.11: Word2Vec model with parameters
reaching the maximum quality, chosen from Figure 5.8.
Log window length: 30 s
Figure 5.12: Automatically weighted graphs. Con-
text window length: 30 s, event window length: 10 s,
metrics window length: 120 s
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5.5 Evaluation: Cross-system diagnostics - transferring knowledge
In this section, we evaluate our approach in a more cloud-oriented environment, by running microservice
architectures made up of containers.
5.5.1 Experimental environment
We use Grid’5000 a customizable testbed that provides access to different computing resources and
infrastructures. We deploy a cluster of 7 virtual machines with 16 GB of RAM and four cores. We install
DC/OS7 on these machines, a container orchestration tool that will allow us to deploy the microservice
architectures. The setup is 1 master node, 1 public node, and 5 private nodes. Additional information
about DC/OS parts can be found in their website8. We use two additional representative Big Data
architectures to perform root cause analysis with them. The first one is a Cassandra deployment with
5 Cassandra containers that are going to be continuously queried by 10 containers with Yahoo Cloud
Service Benchmark [106] installed. The second one is a Kafka architecture, in which we have 5 brokers,
10 producers that push messages to the Kafka cluster and 10 consumers that read those messages.
Additionally, the Kafka brokers need a Zookeeper [107] instance to coordinate them. A simplified
version of the graph representations we use for these deployments is shown in Figure 5.13. Note that
these two architectures are very similar with a decentralized cluster of servers or brokers that interact
with each other and clients that read or write data into this cluster. This scenario is a suitable one for
our knowledge transfer approach since failures that happen in one system will have a similar effect if
they also occur in the other one.
5.5.2 Methodology
Regarding the failures, we injected them in both the hosts and the containers. For the hosts, we use the
same high CPU, high disk, and high network transfer anomalies as in the Spark scenario to stress the
machines. For the containers, we pause them through docker pause instead of using host shutdown
and network failure. We do so because a container cannot be physically disconnected from the network





Figure 5.13: A simplified version of the graph representations we use for the microservice architectures. On the left the
Kafka architecture with a Zookeeper instance coordinating the brokers and producers and consumers using the message
queue. On the right a Cassandra cluster with the YCSB clients. Notice how the VM’s are connected to the containers
they are hosting through edges that represent this relationship.
5.5.3 Evaluation: Cross-system diagnostics
We present detailed results of the evaluation in Figure 5.14. Average f1-score is 0.77 in case of using
Cassandra as a source system and Kafka as a target one. In the reversed configuration, the result
is 0.76. Note that the scores of the cross-system diagnostics are better than the first evaluation of
the framework, due to the different number of types of the injected failures. Both quality results are
approximately equal, thanks to the symmetry of similarity function. The small difference is caused by
the task of finding the nearest graph (a one with the highest similarity number). This operation is not
always symmetric. Considering that two systems are different, in their topology, behavior, and logs,
the results are showing high performance of the proposed framework.
Figure 5.14: Plot presenting results of cross-system diagnostics via finding the nearest graph representing an anomalous
state of a system. Results of two cases are presented. 1) Source system: Cassandra, target system: Kafka; 2) Source
system: Kafka, target system: Cassandra. Average f1-score and accuracy: 1) 0.76, 0.77; 2) 0.77, 0.77.
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5.6 Discussion, conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we proposed a framework for finding the nearest failure cause via similarity evaluation
of weighted graphs. The framework is aimed to diagnose one system when the knowledge about
failures is acquired from another system with a different structure. It can mean a use case where a new
system has just started operating, it fails, and it is hard to diagnose it. Also, the proposed framework
aims to facilitate knowledge transfer between systems and operators. Firstly, we described the whole
framework and its contributions. The most significant contributions are automatic calculations of
metric weights; integration of logs with system topology and metrics into graph representation of a
system; and leveraging historical metric values for similarity calculations. Then, we evaluated the
proposed framework in total with four different systems. We inject common anomalies and failures,
such as hardware overload, node crash, and network disconnections. In the first evaluation section, we
use Spark and Hadoop clusters. We confirm the quality of root cause classification that achieves average
f1-score of 0.71 for Hadoop and 0.61 for Spark. These results show that the framework outperforms
state of the art methods. In the second evaluation, we utilize a cloud environment of containers. We
evaluate cross-system diagnostics via knowledge transfer - diagnosing a target system when knowledge
about failure causes and anomalous states is known only from a source system. We run a scenario
of Kafka acting as a source system, Cassandra as a target one, and a reversed one. Cross-system
diagnostics reaches f1-score of 0.77. The achieved results confirm that the proposed framework, and
in particular its ability of knowledge transfer, allows reaching the state of self-manageable IT systems.
In the next stage of research on cross-system diagnostics we focus on:
• Evaluation of the framework on the real large-scale environments. We would like to integrate the
framework with a failure prevention system.
• Aspect of explainable knowledge transfer in cross-system diagnostics.
• Distinguishing random errors, and the ones which are critical for the future system performance
and reliability.
• Mechanism for automatic propagation of weights for anomalous regions inside graphs.
• Research in the field of predicting failures with the use of transfer learning.
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CHAPTER 6
INCREASING PERFORMANCE THROUGH PREDICTION AND PREVENTION
OF FUTURE FAILURES
Failed jobs in a supercomputer cause not only waste in CPU time or energy consumption but also
decrease work efficiency of users. Mining data collected during the operation of data centers helps to
find patterns explaining failures and can be used to predict them. Automating system reactions, e.g.,
early termination of jobs, when software failures are predicted does not only increase availability and
reduce operating cost, but it also frees administrators’ and users’ time. In this chapter, we explore a
unique dataset containing the topology, operation metrics, and job scheduler history from the petascale
Mistral supercomputer. We extract the most relevant system features deciding on the final state of
a job through decision trees. Then, we successfully train a neural network to predict job evolution
based on power time series of nodes. Finally, we evaluate the effect on CPU time saving for static and
dynamic job termination policies.
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6.1 Different prediction approaches leading to prevention of failures
Data centers are a core element in most IT systems, hosting cloud applications, enabling HPC or
performing intensive Big Data analytics. Although the optimal architecture of a data center may be
different for each of these applications, general maintenance problems remain the same. Failures in
hardware and infrastructure can both cause software failures or may be the result of such software
failures. Software errors are the most common cause of failures [57]. Also, many jobs produce large
network and storage system loads which degrade the system performance [108].
Data presenting the state of a system is usually so complex that administrators might not take
the best decision to recover a system efficiently. Moreover, in many cloud-oriented services, system
monitoring information is limited to hardware metrics, and do not include user application logs. Thus,
it is even more challenging to predict job failures and take proper action. Evaluating jobs in run-time
augments administrative metrics and increases the confidence of taken decisions. Therefore, jobs which
are likely to fail or decrease the performance of a system can be terminated in advance. Such an early
termination allows to save resources, computing and human time, and it lowers operational costs.
According to the dataset used in this chapter, completed jobs in the petascale Mistral1 supercomputer
consume about 45 million CPU hours per month and they are 91.3% of all submitted jobs. Predicting
the final job state at the time of job submission and during run-time allows for forcing job termination
before a failure occurs, enabling savings. However, deciding when it is necessary to terminate a job is
a nontrivial task.
In this chapter, we show insights and results of operational data analysis from petascale supercom-
puter Mistral. We explore predictability of a supercomputing environment, utilizing this particular use
case. Data sources include hardware monitoring data, job scheduler history, topology, and hardware
information. We explore job state sequences, spatial distribution, and electric power patterns. We
augment datasets during the exploration to show how knowledge coming from job scheduler, monitor-
ing system, and topology and structure, can increase prediction capabilities and uncover new patterns.
We discriminate among job submission features that explain the termination status of jobs based on
job traces.
Then, we analyze the impact of both static and dynamic job termination policies using different
data center metrics. We propose new job state prediction algorithms based on Decision Trees (DT)
1https://www.top500.org/system/178567
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and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). We use power series of nodes to build a model used for
failure prediction at run-time. The trained CNN achieves 85% of precision in the classification of failed
jobs by power series. The CNN predicts failures for more than 40% of failed jobs in the 20th percentile
of their execution time.
We describe used data set in Section 6.2. We show results of above mentioned analysis in Section 6.3.
Then we focus on prevention of failures. Section 6.4 presents the extraction of important features and
their discovery by means of DTs that are created using these data. Then, in Section 6.5, we describe
the training and use of a CNN for job state prediction. At the end of Section 6.5, we show savings
applying different policies for early job termination. We discuss results, the usefulness of the proposed
policies and include plans for future research in Section 6.6.
Our contributions are:
• Data mining and advanced analysis of data sets describing runtime of the petascale Mistral
supercomputer. (Section 6.4)
• Failure prevention policies: static and dynamic one. Static policy is based on Decision Trees
and data known at the time of a job submission, while dynamic one uses a Convolutional Neural
Network and power of nodes allocated for a job. (Section 6.5)
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6.2 Mistral Supercomputer Dataset
6.2.1 Job scheduler history
Through analysis of historical data from the scheduler, we investigate which features are important,
thus deciding on a final job state. This goal motivates our strategy, which is oriented to jobs rather
than nodes. We use states from the scheduler to determine an output of a job. In the dataset, each
job finishes with one of the following states, defined by Slurm documentation.
• Cancelled – A user or administrator cancelled a job. The job may or may not have been
initiated. In the following analysis, we consider only cancelled jobs longer than 0 s.
• Completed – Job has terminated all processes on all nodes with an exit code of zero.
• Failed – Job terminated with non-zero exit code or another failure condition. According to
Mistral, another failure condition includes failures caused by any external factor to an allocated
node, e.g., failures of Lustre FS, IB.
• Node fail – Job terminated due to a failure of one or more allocated nodes. This state includes
only hardware related problems of a computational node.
• Timeout – Job terminated upon reaching its time limit.
Each job consists of one or more steps. A job submission script defines the execution order of steps;
also, the order can be read from Slurm history. The order can be sequential, parallel, or mixed, see
example script in Listing 6.1.
Listing 6.1: Example Slurm batch script. Two steps run sequentially on 80 nodes.
#SBATCH −−nodes 80
#SBATCH −−tasks−per−node 10
# F i r s t s tep
srun −−nodes 80 −−ta sk s 10 mkdir /home/$USER/$SLURM JOBID
# Second step
srun app . mpi in . csv out . csv
Most steps in Mistral dataset are executed sequentially. In the Slurm database, there are 76
columns. They contain information about jobs: (1) job configuration specified by a user, and (2)
statistics known at the end of a job. We give more details about these data in Subsection 6.2.3. In
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this chapter, we consider all above job states. For steps, the dataset includes: Completed, Failed and
Cancelled.
6.2.2 Time series data analysis
Mistral metrics are acquired every 60 s into an Open Time Series Database (OTSDB) instance that
is installed on the top of HBase cluster. For this research, the data from the cluster are exported
using the HBase ExportSnapshot tool. Then, we import a snapshot with the size of 0.5 TB from a
regular continuous period of 10 months of system executions to our analysis environment containing
8 machines with 120 physical cores, 672 GB of RAM. We use Apache Spark for data processing. For
training of a CNN, we need job scheduler data merged with power metrics. We merge Slurm steps
with data from OTSDB representing power metrics of nodes used by a step during its run-time. That
merged steps should contain at least two power measurements. In the worst case, for steps shorter
than 120 s, it is possible to merge only one timestamp with node power metrics. So, in the evaluation,
we consider a subset of steps longer than 120 s. Discarding short jobs, we do not lose many data: about
1.2M of all steps from the set run for more than 60 s and 1.1M more than 120 s.
6.2.3 Dataset split
We show how different knowledge sources: software – job scheduler, hardware – monitoring system,
and platform – topology and structure, impact prediction and classification accuracy. Also, we detect
which part of the data increases the prediction capabilities of a model when the only used information
is the one known at the time of a job submission; and which part of the data improves classification
capabilities, when we use statistics of finished jobs. Datasets are divided into the following sets - named
with a capital letter for later reference:
• Slurm job configuration data: information of either jobs or steps, which is known at the time
of submission e.g., reserved time, allocated nodes, required CPU frequency, start time.
[we call it dataset C in the experiments]
• Slurm user data: columns with information about prior user allocations. Also, this dataset
contains aggregated user data. The set includes factors of jobs terminated with each of 5 possible
states to a number of all submissions in different windows. We aggregate the data by user and
windows with different sizes: last N submissions (N=1, 100, 1k, 10k). [dataset U ]
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• Slurm job summary data: information is known at the end of a job, e.g., duration, disk
read/write (R/W) – the sum of local storage and Lustre operations done by a job, virtual memory
(VM) size, other hardware usage. [dataset S ]
• Power metrics of nodes (OTSDB data): power metrics of computing nodes (blades).
[dataset P ]
• Data center topology: topology and localization of nodes. [dataset T ]
• Hardware profiles of nodes: types of nodes, number and types of CPUs, amount of RAM.
[dataset H ]
In Figure 6.1, a high-level scheme of data processing modules and data sources is presented.
Figure 6.1: High-level data processing scheme
82
6.3 Predictability of an HPC Environment: Data Mining
6.3.1 General statistics
According to the data from the job scheduler, more than 1.3M jobs, and more than 270k different
job names were submitted in the 10-months period represented by the dataset extracted from the
Mistral production environment. These submissions, which are mainly executed in batch mode (98.8%),
resulting in over 4.8M steps. Completed jobs are 91.3% of all submitted ones. In contrast, 5.6% of
started jobs result in the fail state, 1.7% of submissions are cancelled, 1.4% result in timeout, and
0.028% fail because of computing node problems. Through the analysis of these data, it is observed
that the mean number of allocated nodes is 3.4 for completed steps and 18 for failed ones. This result
follows a typical pattern usually reported in state of the art: failed steps are usually more complicated.
Average duration and standard deviation of failed jobs and completed ones are quite similar. When
it comes to steps, completed ones take in average 414 s, while failed almost three times more. For
detailed statistics, see Table 6.1 for jobs and Table 6.2 for steps. These general statistics represent
a convincing motivation for generating savings with the early termination of jobs predicted to fail.
An average failed job consumes many more CPU hours than completed one and decreases resources
availability. About 1.2M of all steps from the set run for more than 60 s and 1.1M more than 120 s.
Table 6.1: Jobs statistics by Slurm state
State count
Allocated nodes Duration [s]
mean SD min 50% 75% max mean SD min 50% 75% max
CANCELLED 23087 25 100 1 5 16 3264 2680 14952 1 310 1591 1.6M
COMPLETED 1238585 12 34 1 6 16 3276 1954 4190 1 419 1953 0.3M
FAILED 75897 15 39 1 6 16 1700 1763 4288 1 164 2979 0.4M
NODE FAIL 390 67 289 1 10 46 3264 11087 105332 38 2472 6202 2.1M
TIMEOUT 17864 16 57 1 1 16 3078 11586 18140 60 2408 28803 0.6M
ALL 1355823 13 37 1 6 16 3276 2085 5444 1 425 2001 2.1M
Table 6.2: Steps statistics by Slurm state
State count
Allocated nodes Duration [s] Ave Disk Read [GB] Ave Disk Write [GB]
mean SD min max mean SD min max mean SD min max mean SD min max
CANCELLED 53579 28 87 1 3264 3322 8679 1 183k 16 151 0 7821 3 37 0 2341
COMPLETED 4853842 3.4 17 1 3276 414 1902 1 235k 1 10 0 6993 0.2 5 0 30742
FAILED 197704 18 28 1 3249 1111 5273 1 346k 3 73 0 6629 0.2 15 0 4078
ALL 5105125 4.2 20 1 3276 471 2326 1 346k 1 23 0 7821 0.2 7 0 4078
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6.3.2 Job state sequences
Outcomes from previous analysis encourage the analysis of correlations between user’s past jobs and the
final state of a subsequent job. Firstly, we create a matrix presenting job state transitions. In details,
Figure 6.2 illustrates states of 2-jobs sequences, grouped by a user name and job name (exact string
match). Another possibility to build these sequences is to match jobs by parts of their names, e.g.,
without suffixes, which usually stand for a simulated year, or another parameter of a run application.
Previous state NONE refers to initial submissions, from which 88% completes, and the majority of the
rest fails. Importantly, only 19% of next submissions complete after a job failed and 75% of them still
fail. Majority of jobs completes after a hardware failure of a node. Also, these data reveal important
rationales. For instance, users often submit applications which are correct and do not fail. Then
they start trails, implement changes, or merely develop their models. Majority of next submissions
completes, but still, failures are two times more probable than cancellations or timeouts. A typical user
is more likely to have a job in the completed state after it is cancelled than it is failed. An interesting
fact is that the probability of a node failure reaches its maximum value after another node failure,
and it has the same order of magnitude for all other states. Moreover, we present mean time between
subsequent submissions in Figure 6.3 with corresponding standard deviation in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.2: Heat-map presenting transition between 2 subsequent jobs, grouped by a user name and job name. For
instance, after 0.32 of all jobs which are cancelled, the next jobs are completed ones
Regarding the correlation between cancelled and failed, 13% of next submissions after cancellations
fails and only one third completes. Moreover, Table 6.2 shows that cancelled steps are characterized
by much higher disk RW than completed and even failed ones. One of the potential causes after
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Figure 6.3: Heat-map presenting mean time [in seconds]
between subsequent job states, grouped by user, applica-
tion name.
Figure 6.4: Heat-map presenting SD [in seconds] between
subsequent job states, grouped by user, application name.
interviewing system administrators is that they cancel steps, due to high storage system usage – IO
counters. Naturally, after cancellation, a job is possibly corrected and re-submitted to be completed.
Further analysis is shown in Figure 6.5 which presents average factors of past failed and cancelled
jobs to all submitted jobs in different N number of prior submissions for each job state. A readable
observation is that, on average, in the preceding ten jobs there are as many cancelled jobs as failed
ones for all states except node fail - probably lack of diverse samples. It can be highlighted that a
cancellation often follows up other cancellations and a failure - other failures.
Figure 6.5: Plot presenting distributions of users’ factors of failed and cancelled jobs for last N=10, 100, 1000 submissions
for each succeeding job state. Users with more than 10 jobs submitted are counted. For instance, before failed job, a
max. factor of failed in window of last N=10 submissions is 0.5.
Besides, in Figure 6.6, we present correlation type distribution between the number of failed and
cancelled jobs in different time windows. Aggregation in 4-week periods and no lag (no shift between
series) between these sequences reveals the highest number of sequences with correlation coefficient
over a fixed threshold of 0.3. Additionally, we present distributions of a correlation coefficient value,
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see Figure 6.8 for different time windows. These distributions show that correlations are stronger for
longer periods – weeks over days. In link with this, sequences of cancellations and failures are presented
in Figure 6.7 for a randomly chosen user with relatively high activity. Surprisingly, it is observed that
local minima of failed and cancelled jobs exist in the same time periods. In contrast, high activity
of a user does not necessarily mean a high number of failures and cancellations. Naturally, a user
might submit the same working code. These sequences reveal that there are periods of re-running the
same models, and periods of experiments when a model is changed. This phenomenon is confirmed by
researchers working in DKRZ.
Figure 6.6: Plot presenting distribution of Pearson cor-
relation coefficient for users with min. 1000 jobs submit-
ted, correlation is counted for coefficients > 0.3. Total
304 users.
Figure 6.7: Plot presenting cancelled and failed job se-
quences aggregated in 3-week periods, for a relatively active
user.




The overall cycle of jobs depending on the daytime can be seen in Figure 6.9. The number of jobs
by the state is normalized to the mean number of started jobs during the whole daytime. Naturally,
during the night the number of started jobs is much lower. Between 10 and 17 hour, the number of
submissions is over the mean. Moreover, in Figure 6.11, we present distribution of time elapsed from
job submission to a job start. This distribution shows that the highest waiting time is for jobs resulted
in a timeout and node fail state.
In Figure 6.10, we present the average number of cancelled and failed jobs aggregated by daytime.
It is clear that the highest number of failed ones starts between 14 and 16, while for cancelled the
maximum is at 15 hour.
Figure 6.9: Plot presenting cancelled and failed jobs de-
pending on the daytime of a job start
Figure 6.10: Plot presenting daily mean number (with
stddev) of jobs finished as cancelled or failed by the daytime
of a job start
Figure 6.11: Plot presenting distributions of waiting time of submissions by state
87
6.3.4 Distribution of a job over the data center
Topology-aware resources allocation is applied as well as in Slurm, and other schedulers, see [109–111].
The job scheduler is optimized to use nodes which are closest to each other to reduce latency in data
transfer. An interesting aspect to explore might be the distribution of the jobs over racks. Through
this, we can discover the dependency between the number of network hops and failed jobs. The number
of hops represents the complexity of a network topology for a particular job and increases with the
number of used racks since a switch is mounted in each chassis. For this, we choose a subset of
steps allocated on more than one node with duration more than 60 s. In average, completed steps are
allocated on 1.1, σ = 0.8 racks, cancelled on 2.3, σ = 2.8 and failed on 1.8, σ = 1.8. Completed steps
are not only distinguished by the lowest number of used racks, but also the lowest number of allocated
nodes, as seen in Table 6.2.
The mean number of racks used by multi-node steps is 1.92. This distribution is presented in
Figure 6.12. This figure also shows the probability of a failure according to the number of racks used
for a step, and the maximum is at seven racks. For the number of racks over 13, which means using
even more than 1000 computing nodes, occurrences of failures are rare. This phenomenon can be
explained rather by a user’s behavior than hardware dependencies. Most of HPC jobs are projected
to be run on a specific number of nodes. This dependency is opposite to Big Data business software,
where horizontal scaling on demand is one of the most important requirements in an application. So,
the code for huge HPC jobs seems to be better tested and reliable for a fixed number of nodes.
Figure 6.12: Plot presenting number of racks used for allocations for all steps and failed steps. N=841k
In Figure 6.13, we analyze duration over the number of racks used by a step. Notably, failed steps
are statistically shorter than completed, when approximately less than ten racks are used for a step.
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In this case, failures occur probably in the early phase of executed code. However, for the number of
racks larger than 12, duration of failed steps significantly increases, while for completed ones it is kept
on the same level. In Figure 6.14, distribution of the number of allocated nodes versus the number
of racks can be seen. This relation is linear, although, in range of 10 and 20 racks used, the median
number of allocated nodes does not increase. Completed steps with less than 100 nodes used are often
placed in less than ten racks. It is opposite to failed or cancelled steps. The cancelled and failed ones
are sparser, and for a few nodes allocated often use more racks.
Figure 6.13: Plot presenting duration depending on number of racks used for a step
Figure 6.14: Plot presenting number of allocated nodes depending on number of racks used for a step
6.3.5 Node-power analysis
We investigate the power statistics of failed jobs in comparison with completed ones. Each computing
blade is controlled and monitored by an isolated blade management controller which delivers power
metrics. A controller is an external unit and acquiring measurements does not interfere with the
workload of a blade. Power metrics of these blades perfectly depict their CPU load. Although in
Subsection 6.4.1 we evaluate the usefulness of power statistics in predictions, we might also evaluate
whether these series can improve job state prediction during the run-time.
We correlate power series of nodes allocated for a step with this the final state of this step and types
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of allocated nodes. In Table 6.3 we present average blade power and average last registered power for
different job submissions states. In Table 6.4, we present power statistics for steps longer than 1000 s,
grouped by hardware profile. The table shows average values of power metrics in the last 300 s. This
value is lower for completed steps than for failed ones for all hardware groups. for some, it is even 15%
difference. The most probable explanation can be the fact that once a software failure occurs some of
the nodes go to an idle state.
Table 6.3: Power statistics depending on a submitted job state, for submissions longer than 120 s






Node failed 226 190










B720-compute 36 64 CANCELLED 196 76 1.11
B720-compute 36 64 COMPLETED 176 82 1.00
B720-compute 36 64 FAILED 172 71 0.97
B720-compute 36 256 CANCELLED 209 75 1.00
B720-compute 36 256 COMPLETED 210 82 1.00
B720-compute 36 256 FAILED 186 76 0.89
B720-compute 36 128 CANCELLED 198 79 1.16
B720-compute 36 128 COMPLETED 170 82 1.00
B720-compute 36 128 FAILED 167 74 0.98
B720-compute 24 64 CANCELLED 225 92 0.95
B720-compute 24 64 COMPLETED 239 107 1.00
B720-compute 24 64 FAILED 190 113 0.80
B720-compute 24 256 CANCELLED 269 134 0.97
B720-compute 24 256 COMPLETED 277 154 1.00
B720-compute 24 256 FAILED 242 154 0.87
B720-compute 24 128 CANCELLED 248 116 0.93
B720-compute 24 128 COMPLETED 266 141 1.00
B720-compute 24 128 FAILED 227 142 0.85
For instance, Figure 6.15 presents power series of 1-step jobs, both executed with the same configu-
ration by the same user. This scenario represents a typical case where one node is in an idle state, and
the rest are executing some workload. On the contrary, power series of nodes executing a completed
step do not show any node in an idle state. This phenomenon appears in other cases in the dataset
and suggests that using power metrics would be relevant for classification of a job state. Moreover,
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this observation matches with the expert knowledge at DKRZ. In words of one of its system engineers:
“We check the idle state of a node during a problematic job, looking at InfiniBand traffic of nodes. If
it is low, a job is likely to fail.”
(a) Failed (b) Completed
Figure 6.15: Plots presenting power series of 198 nodes running in parallel a job from the same, user, project, and
application. Two jobs were run in different points of time. First one is failed, the next one is completed.
6.3.6 Additional analysis
During this research we analyzed other issues, which are not presented in previous sections, but are
valuable to notice. Firstly, we evaluated heat exchange between blades, to check if there is any
correlation between the temperature of blades placed in the same chassis. Probably because of high-
performance cooling infrastructure, no relationship is discovered. Another considered issue is the
priority of a job submission in relation to its final state. No apparent correlation is observed, although
an anomaly is detected in the distribution of priority level for the timeout state. Comparing to other
states, a normalized frequency of submissions with high priority is significantly higher for timeouts.
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6.4 Mining important features and predicting the final job state with Decision Trees
According to the data from the job scheduler, more than 1.3M jobs, and more than 270k different
job names are submitted in the 10-month period that is represented by the dataset extracted from
the Mistral production environment. These submissions, which are mainly executed in batch mode
(98.8%), result in over 4.8M steps. One of the observations from the statistics is coherent with the
usual state of the art reports - failed steps are usually more complex [55]. These statistics represent a
convincing motivation for generating savings with the early termination of jobs that are predicted to
fail. An average failed job consumes many more CPU hours than completed one and it also decreases
resources availability.
6.4.1 Most meaningful features for prediction of job states
Extraction of features. We generate Decision Trees (DTs) [112] to reveal job and step features ex-
plaining a job state. These ML models learn if-then-else rules, for either classification or regression
task. An advantage of using a DT is the fact that it is a white-box model so that a human can easily
understand a trained tree. We use all the features from each dataset for generation of a DT. To decide
the optimal size of DTs, we consider (1) over-fitting and (2) readability of a model to a human. Firstly,
we split our set into three sets using random stratified sampling. We create the training set containing
70% of jobs (samples), the validation set that has 10% of jobs (samples), and the test set with 20% of
jobs. During the training, we measure accuracy on the validation set, while increasing depth of a tree.
We set 100 as the minimum number of instances each node’s child must have after a split. Trees with
depth 5 obtain satisfactory performance. For larger DTs, the accuracy increase is low (0.03%), and the
increase of the number of nodes is high. For instance, a tree with depth 9 has 275 nodes, and it is 84
nodes more than a DT with depth 8. Thus, we choose the optimal depth of the DT to be 5, which has
63 nodes. To check if models are not over-fitting, we evaluate random forests (RF) for each dataset.
RF creates DTs and trains them with different training sets that are subsets of the main training set.
Then, the results of each DT are combined. In our case, using RFs improve neither classification nor
prediction quality when compared to the above DTs.
The test evaluations show the fitness of generated models of classification (having all information
about a finished job), and prediction (having only information at the time of submission). We present
the results in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. We include only features with importance greater than 3%.
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precision 0.91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
recall 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0




previous job state for a user (96%)
number of allocated nodes (3%)
precision 0.97 0.75 0.52 0.68 0.0
recall 0.98 0.70 0.44 0.30 0.0
f1-score 0.98 0.72 0.48 0.42 0.0
statistics+
configuration+
user’s history (S + C + U)
previous job state (87%)
duration (9%)
number of allocated nodes (4%)
precision 0.97 0.77 0.63 0.81 0.0
recall 0.99 0.74 0.36 0.35 0.0
f1-score 0.98 0.75 0.46 0.49 0.0
duration>120 s statistics,
configuration,
user’s history (S + C + U)
previous job state (85%)
duration (8%)
number of allocated nodes (6%)
precision 0.97 0.81 0.62 0.80 0.0
recall 0.99 0.74 0.31 0.33 0.0
f1-score 0.98 0.77 0.41 0.47 0.0




Job state Completed Failed Cancelled
configuration(C) number of allocated nodes (98%)
precision 0.95 0.50 0
recall 0.99 0.07 0
f1-score 0.97 0.12 0
configuration, statistics
(C + S)
number of allocated nodes (47%)
average disk W (40%)
duration (4%)
precision 0.98 0.83 0.58
recall 0.99 0.76 0.04
f1-score 0.99 0.79 0.79
duration>120 s
configuration, statistics(C + S)
average disk W (47%)
number of allocated nodes (36%)
average CPU frequency (9%); duration (4%)
precision 0.95 0.59 0.89
recall 0.98 0.23 0.83
f1-score 0.97 0.33 0.86
configuration, topology,
hardware information (C + T + H)
number of allocated nodes (79%)
number of nodes 36C 64GB RAM (15%)
number of nodes 36C 128GB RAM (3%)
precision 0.97 0.75 0.49
recall 0.98 0.41 0.01
f1-score 0.98 0.53 0.01
configuration, statistics,
topology, hardware information,
power statistics (C + S + T + H + P)
number of allocated nodes (46%)
average disk W (41%); average disk R (5%)
average VM size (4%)
precision 0.98 0.85 0.52
recall 0.99 0.75 0.10
f1-score 0.98 0.80 0.17
duration>120 s,
(C + S + T + H + P)
average disk W (49%)
number of allocated nodes (35%)
average CPU frequency (10%)
precision 0.94 0.93 0.81
recall 0.99 0.79 0.13
f1-score 0.97 0.85 0.22
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Jobs. The above results show that the size of the resource reservation is a principal factor deter-
mining the final state of a job. Also, the results expose that final states are highly correlated with a
user’s history. In general, this correlation is weaker for longer jobs.
Steps. Generated DTs reveal that the sum of disk RW is often higher for completed jobs than failed
ones. Since the mean duration of failed steps is much higher than completed ones, see Table 6.2, higher
storage usage can be explained by less active nodes in failed steps. We can state a hypothesis, that some
nodes in failed steps stay in idle state, see Section 6.3.5. The evaluation shows the high importance of
a number of allocated nodes with 36 cores. An upgrade done in DKRZ explains this phenomenon. The
dataset includes the period when Broadwell nodes started their service in the production environment.
That time, users were translating their software and scripts to the recently installed hardware. It is
the primary cause of many job failures.
Conclusions. The evaluation of DT classification tasks reveals that a DT model is unable to
classify and predict cancelled, node failed (0% for all of the data sources), or timeout jobs based only
on configuration data. These data are the only information known to the scheduler after a job is
submitted. The f1-score is 0 for all of the mentioned states. Augmenting this set with past user’s
submissions improves recall of failed jobs to 72% and lifts the precision of predicting cancellations to
52% and timeouts to 68%. This result shows a strong correlation inside a sequence of final job states.
Adding to the training dataset metrics which are known after a job is finished increases the precision
of a classifier. The recall does not change for any of the states. Regarding steps, precision and recall
are lower than those for job submissions. It is a reasonable result considering that steps have a lower
number of features available for these evaluations. The number of allocated nodes is an important
feature to predict the final state of a job even when used with hardware metrics features. Other
important features are knowledge on past submissions and their states. According to the hardware
statistics, average disk W is a highly important feature in the classification task of final job states,
while general power statistics are features with low importance. Note that according to steps, none of
the data sources maximizes the prediction abilities of all of the states.
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6.5 Prevention of failures through static and dynamic policy
Prior data exploration and evaluation of DTs show that power metrics and DTs can be used for
prediction of final job state. Predictions contain probabilities for each step state. During prediction,
we classify a step as failed, when the probability of failure is higher than a defined threshold and all other
probabilities associated with other classes. Therefore, we propose two types of policies to be used: a
static and dynamic one. A static policy uses predictions based on a step configuration data, topology,
and hardware information (C + T +H) through DTs. A dynamic policy uses predictions during run-
time which are produced by a convolutional neural network (CNN), introduced in Section 6.5.1. The
inputs to this model are power metrics, which are analyzed in Section 6.3.5. While using a dynamic
policy, a job is killed when it is classified as failed for the first time – the earliest prediction over the
given threshold.
The use of different types of models, one as a white-box and the other as a black-box has several ad-
vantages over, for instance, one complex NN model trained with both static and dynamic data. Firstly,
the use of DTs enables to easily explain phenomena observed in a data center to system administrators.
Since a model can evolve by repeating the training, changes in trends and user behavior occurred in
a data center are observed as results of the comparison of models. Also, a failure prevention system
gains performance during the run-time because of splitting evaluation to offline (time of submission
only) and online (evaluation of a job during its runtime) one.
6.5.1 Dynamic Policy: Preventing failures during runtime through Convolutional Neural
Networks
CNNs are a type of deep neural network [113] following a design of biological vision systems [114]. They
are widely used for image classification, natural language processing, and recommendation systems,
and they have also been successfully used for time series classification and prediction. We propose to
use a CNN for classification and prediction of multivariate time series, which are the power metrics of
nodes (overall energy consumption of a computing blade) used in a step. Therefore, CNN learns “how
a multivariate time series of nodes executing a step look like.” A major advantage of using CNNs
over neural nets with fully connected (dense) layers only, is that they need much fewer neurons and
parameters to solve a particular classification or prediction problem. CNNs are able to learn features
and share neuron weights, which minimizes their space complexity.
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Figure 6.16: Graph presenting a trained CNN with layers type and shape of the data
In Figure 6.16, we present the best CNN model trained for this task. We create the final model
after a few iterations, through dropping layers from more complex models which over-fit during the
training and do not increase the accuracy. The model presented in Figure 6.16 comprises a few types
of layers. Each convolutional layer comprises filters with size 3x3, and during the training, each filter
learns weights. This layer is used to extract specific features, in this case from 2D matrices. Another
important layer type used is a drop-out, which regularizes weights and through dropping neurons and
connections, prevent overfitting [115]. A max pooling layer and dense layer are used to aggregate
extracted features and classify them into defined classes and give probabilities. The input data are 2D
matrices of size M=512 (number of nodes) x T=120 (length of time series). For steps with matrices
which shape is less than MxT , we pad a sample with zeros - which are ignored by CNN during the
training. For these matrices which are larger than that size, we downsample a matrix by averaging
power metrics. The value for T is chosen so that it is large enough to represent the complete series of
most of the steps (only 1.3% of steps are longer than 120 min) and at the same time it is small enough
for the NN training to be practical. The dataset with steps is split randomly (the same split as in
Section 6.4) into three sets: training (70% of the data), validation (10%), and test (20%) respectively.
The CNN is trained using tensorflow2 and keras3 libraries by means of 2x GPU GeForce 1080 Ti.
Also, after a few trails and examining a shape of the loss curve, the learning rate is set to 0.001, and
we choose a stochastic gradient descent optimizer. The final model, which contains 32261 parameters




significant improvement in the loss curve, and when the model does not improve more than 1% in 5
epochs. We show results of the trained CNN in Table 6.7. We can see, that all classes are classified
with the satisfactory level of precision: from 79% for cancelled to 93% for completed. However, the
f1-score is acceptable only for failed (74%) and completed (96%) jobs.
6.5.2 Evaluation: Static and dynamic job-killing policies
The primary goal of the evaluation is to explore possible savings and losses depending on the ag-
gressiveness of job-killing policy. We measure the aggressiveness of a policy as the threshold of class
prediction probability. For instance, a threshold of 60% means that a job is classified as failed when the
probability of predicting failed is higher than 60%. An aggressive policy is the one with a low threshold,
and the less aggressive one is the one with a high threshold, e.g., greater than 90%. We evaluate the
trained CNN model and DT to predict the final states of steps. We use a test set which contains jobs
with total CPU time of 84.7M h. CNN predicts a final job state and outputs probabilities for each
timestamp during the run of a job. We evaluate proposed policies by depicting lost and gained CPU
time, expressed in hours. Lost CPU time stands for the resources consumed by a step that is labeled
as completed, but it is killed (false positive). Saved CPU time represents resources that would be used
until a step ends but are saved due to a decision of early step termination. Approximate performance
of CNN evaluation is 5000 samples/s which is considered sufficient for these experiments.
Table 6.7: CNN test results - Classification. Data set: steps – power metrics, duration > 120 s
Completed Failed Cancelled
precision 0.93 0.85 0.79
recall 0.98 0.66 0.15
f1-score 0.96 0.74 0.25
test set 168875 28605 4457
Table 6.8: Summary of the dynamic policy evaluation over a test set containing 11M CPU hours of failed jobs
Dynamic policy metric CPU h Probability threshold
maximum savings achievable 7.9M <0;0.42>
maximum loss (false positive) 4.1M 0.52
global maximum (savings - loss) 4.0M <0;0.42>
local maximum of (savings - loss) 0.7M 0.82
Considering the dynamic policy, the maximum value of true positives is 0.9, and for false positives,
the maximum value is 0.45. Both metrics decrease smoothly when the threshold grows. Figure 6.17
shows true and false positive rates depending on the probability threshold for failure prediction with
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the CNN. On the other hand, the static policy is characterized by the maximum value of the true
positive rate of 0.47 and a small value of 0.02 for the false positive rate. The static policy is more
accurate in predictions comparing to the dynamic one, but the maximum number of predicted steps
to fail are almost two times lower.
Wastes. When it comes to the CPU time, the static policy allows for maximum savings of
0.8M CPU h, and the dynamic one (for threshold of the global maximum) of 8M CPU h. In Table 6.8,
we present a summary of the evaluation of the dynamic policy considering CPU hours of jobs. Note,
that the earlier we kill a failed job, the bigger savings are. On the other hand, the confidence of predic-
tion increases with time a job is running as we gather more data. Regarding these trade-offs, there is a
global maximum of losses for threshold 0.52. For instance, applying a dynamic policy with a threshold
of 0.82 (local maximum with the highest threshold value) to the test dataset saves 1.6M CPU h with
0.9M CPU h lost and the total profit of 0.7M CPU h. For instance, a less aggressive policy would be
the application of a threshold equal to 0.96. In this case, we save 210k CPU h, and we lose 24k CPU h,
with the total profit of 190k CPU h. In contrast, executing static policy allows for maximum savings
of 870k CPU h by killing 13k failed jobs with a side effect of killing 3.8k completed ones. Also, the
application of the static policy, which is more conservative, does not cause a loss in CPU time, because
it reacts after job submission.
Figure 6.18 presents the distribution of job time at which the dynamic policy will react and ter-
minate a job. We can see that almost half of the jobs are killed during the first 30% of their total
execution time (the time they take if they are not killed earlier). Then, for the remaining steps, pre-
diction abilities increase after 60% of their duration. Figure 6.18 shows that the dynamic policy can
predict failures early.
Users and system administrators may use policies with different aggressiveness levels. For instance,
a user might choose a very aggressive policy, both static and dynamic with a very low threshold, when
the project budget is highly limited. On the other hand, a less aggressive policy, e.g., a dynamic
policy with a high threshold, above 0.9, can be appropriate for long jobs, where user time is the most
expensive factor to consider. Also, such a policy can maximize savings comparing to use of a static
policy. A static policy used by system administrators can help eliminating problematic jobs, which
may be causing the overload of a system. However, use of dynamic policy can cause dissatisfaction
of users, since this policy can unexpectedly terminate their jobs without a known reason, even when
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Figure 6.17: Plot presents the evaluation of CNN model for different
values of prediction probability threshold. The lower is the threshold,
the more aggressive is the job terminating policy, greater savings, but
we kill more good jobs as a consequence of inaccurate predictions. Total
CPU Hours of failed jobs in a set: 11M.
Figure 6.18: Cumulative plot presenting the
time when the probability of failure exceeds
defined threshold 0.82. N=7300
a user is not currently working with a system. If it happens with the static policy, a user gets a job
terminated immediately after submission, when he is online.
Also, supervised learning through interaction with a user can help improving the proposed policies.
Firstly, users should receive a notification when their jobs are repeatedly killed after re-submissions.
A user or a system administrator could label such a problematic job. This action provides a model
with additional information for incremental improvement. Also, system administrators can decide to
perform supervised learning, to set up the optimal aggressiveness of the policy (threshold).
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6.6 Discussion, conclusion and future work
In this chapter, we analyzed a dataset containing metrics, topology and job scheduler data for the
Mistral supercomputer. We showed important features in a classification and prediction task of a job
state. The number of allocated nodes, the state of a previous job submitted by a user, average storage
writes are the most important ones. DTs detect specific node types as an important feature due to
migration process from the old to the new computing nodes. DTs perform well as a classifier, with a
recall nearly 80% and a precision of 93% for failed steps. As a predictor, DTs can point failed steps,
using configuration and allocated hardware data exclusively, with a recall of 41% and a precision of
75%. In the case of CNNs, these scores increase to 66% and 85% respectively. This chapter shows
that one of the biggest influences on the next state of a job in a supercomputer like Mistral lies in the
diversity and spatial distribution of allocated nodes, place of a job in a user sequence and number of
disk operations.
We evaluated dynamic and static job-killing policies, pointing out possible savings related to the
aggressiveness of both policies. For instance, using medium-aggressive approach, we can kill more than
28% of failed jobs. Through CNN predictions, the proposed dynamic policy kills 40% of jobs in the
first 20% of their duration. These effects can be improved by utilizing feedback from users and system
administrators and adjusting weights of CNN by supervised learning.
As future work, we would like to improve prediction capabilities of the created solution. Firstly, we
can achieve more accurate analysis of final job states by adding OS logs to the analyzed dataset. Also,
this would help to build prediction algorithm of final job states, which is not limited by Slurm job
state but uses the utility of a job. For instance, the utility can be measured by analyzing users’ actions
after a job finishes, e.g., a user copied output data, re-run the same code with different parameters,
changed the code. Therefore, this approach can differentiate jobs with a non-zero return code from
these which were run unnecessary and these which can provide any utility to a user, e.g., development
progress, part of results. Then, we can consider a more complex model which considers step sequence
for a job. Also, we would like to consider additional input information such as real-time metrics from
the data center, e.g., Lustre I/O, overall system load and IB traffic. Finally, we would like to focus




In this Thesis, we presented contributions related to diagnostics, root cause analysis, failure prediction,
and prevention. We performed the research on different computing environments which are crucial for
today and tomorrow IT systems. Specifically, we explored different research problems such as
• scalability of RCA
• dynamism of a diagnosed environment
• integration of logs and metrics to represent system state in the form of a graph
• predictability of a supercomputing environment
• prevention of failures to save resources and user time
We used diverse computing environments for our research: the petascale Mistral supercomputer, sim-
ulated IoT environment, on-premise Big Data cluster, and containers.
Thanks to the research we:
• Proposed a new fast root cause analysis framework which works on an optimized transformation
of Bayesian networks to Arithmetic Circuits. The system performs orders of magnitude faster
while using fewer memory resources while comparing to conventional approaches. The system
can perform approximate inference in Bayesian networks with the size of millions of nodes.
• Proposed an Actor-Based root cause analysis System which can work well in highly distributed
and dynamic environments. The system performs root cause analysis using self-diagnostics con-
cept, which helps to operate in, e.g., environments with connectivity problems.
• Proposed a weighted graph-based framework for root cause classification and diagnostics through
knowledge transfer. The framework represents a system state in the form of a graph, including
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logs, metrics and other information, e.g., hardware or software component types. The framework
finds the closest neighbor graph through the evaluation of graph similarity. The framework is
proven to perform root cause classification through knowledge transfer, achieving f1-score of 0.77.
• Explored trends, and critical job features deciding on an HPC job final state. Then, we proposed
failure prevention policies: dynamic and static one. The static one works on Decision Trees and
different data sets containing historical information on jobs and the infrastructure. It allows
evaluating the likelihood of failure at the time of submission. The dynamic policy works on
historical power series of multinode jobs and Convolutional Neural Networks.
Further development of contributions presented in this thesis can be done in several dimensions.
First of all, actor-based root cause analysis can be deployed on a real Internet of Things environment.
There are existing small and medium-size test-bed platforms containing tens up to hundreds of ele-
ments. However, the challenge is a deployment of ABRCA on millions of intelligent devices. Then,
the experiments can include exploration of the impact of the algorithm to the standard functionality
of IoT devices. Future work on the algorithm can be focused on the resource decision system. Such a
system should take optimal decisions on delegating the stages of the calculations to appropriate devices
and possibly subnetworks of the main network of devices. The resource decision system should con-
sider different constraints and consequences of utilizing various resources, e.g., network, CPU, battery.
Example constraints are latency, energy consumption, and performance degradation.
Next crucial future work is the application of knowledge transfer framework on large scale real
environment. There might be interesting research performed on knowledge transfer framework inte-
grated with knowledge exploration solutions. Such a system could automatically mine knowledge on
failures from parts of the system. The solution might be combined with root cause analysis methods
proposed in this thesis. Another vital issue to consider in the future work is an automatic taxonomy
construction. It can be elaborated starting from host discovery techniques and using more complex
techniques such as mining application and host logs and tracing application calls. Then the knowledge
transfer would be much more automated. Also, the work can be focused on the proactive maintenance.
The further steps according to work on failure prevention policies it can be transferring models
trained on the Mistral dataset to other supercomputing facilities. Interesting research can be performed
to create a universal and transferable model for failure prediction. Then a model could be additionally
trained on specific local data sets.
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We believe that thanks to our contributions we do not only increase the performance of diagnostics
and provide automated tools. We think that thanks to our work the future solutions will be able to
limit the amount of work for the human. We should now focus on aiding the management of systems
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Early Termination of Failed HPC Jobs Through Machine and Deep Learning. Euro-Par, 24th
International European Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing. 2018 [A ranked
conference]
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